EU Fights For Nabucco's Future

By Ahto Lobjakas

BRUSSELS -- The fate of the Nabucco pipeline project appears to be hanging by a thread. No EU official would publicly admit this, but the signs tell their own story. First, as a senior EU official told reporters in Brussels on November 4 on condition of anonymity, transit talks with Turkey have stalled. Second, Azerbaijan is dithering between competing Russian and EU bids for its gas exports, which are crucial to bringing Nabucco on line in 2012 as planned. Third, in the long term, Azerbaijani gas alone will not be sufficient. The EU official said that "other countries in the region" must supply most of the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas Nabucco is expected to carry by 2020.

But Iran, with the world's second-largest reserves, remains off-limits as long as it continues to enrich uranium. And Turkmenistan, with its enormous export potential, has yet to decide whether to invest in a trans-Caspian pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan -- and Nabucco. The common thread for all these countries, and the EU as the ultimate beneficiary of the 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline, is the question of intent and commitment.

EU Makes Its Case
On November 5-7, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will visit Turkey and Azerbaijan to demonstrate the bloc's continued commitment to Nabucco.

"The first objective of this trip is to show the political commitment of the European Commission to the Nabucco project and to reaffirm once more that we are convinced that it is going to be online according to the planned timetable," says Piebalgs' spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas.

The Russian-Georgian conflict sent shock waves through the region and among potential investors. But official Brussels remains steadfast in the belief that Nabucco is safe from Moscow's interference. "Russia would jeopardize its reputation as a reliable supplier" to the EU if it acted in any way to damage Nabucco, said one official.

However, none of Nabucco's essential building blocks is currently in place. Turkey continues to hold out for a better transit deal while Azerbaijan has yet to formally commit its gas exports to the project. Tarradellas says that while Piebalgs' visit is a sign that the EU is upping the ante in its talks with the two countries. "We're going to discuss also the remaining differences with the Turks and the question of the transit of the gas through Turkey," he says, "and then we're going to be visiting Azerbaijan, which will be probably be the first supplier of gas for the Nabucco pipeline."

The senior EU official who spoke on condition of anonymity said that, apart from charging a transit fee, Turkey wants to divert 15 percent of Nabucco's gas for cheap domestic use. As Azerbaijan is insisting on selling its gas at European market rates minus transit costs, the Nabucco consortium and its subsidiaries in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria would be left to pick up the tab. Piebalgs is keen to break the deadlock before the end of the year. In Turkey this week he will meet with the country's president, prime minister, foreign minister, and economy minister.

Where Will Gas Come From?
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has yet to decide to whom to sell the estimated 7-9 bcm of gas it is able to export annually in the early years of Nabucco's operations. The senior Brussels official said EU companies are pitted against Russian competitors. There are fears in the EU that Russian political pressure could clinch the deal for Russian bidders. A decision is expected sometime in 2009.

EU officials say that the fact that Piebalgs has secured a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a sign of "interest" on the part of Baku in doing business with the EU. But Azerbaijan's gas reserves, even if supplemented by the planned expansion of the Shah Deniz field, will not be sufficient to keep Nabucco in business.

And this is where Nabucco currently hits a wall. Iran will remain untouchable  in trade terms as long as it refuses to cease uranium enrichment. Like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be swayed by Moscow's cash -- or outright pressure. And even if Turkmenistan's recently confirmed reserves of 14 trillion bcm dwarf Russia's own transit capacity, Moscow will be seeking to deny the EU a piece of the pie.
Piebalgs is hoping to soon visit Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, his aides say. This leaves Iraq and Egypt as the only other viable regional suppliers for Nabucco -- with one extremely unstable and the other rather remote.

Meanwhile, EU officials reject suggestions Nabucco could eventually carry Russian gas diverted south. This, they say, would defeat the purpose of Nabucco -- which is to diversify supplies. (Competing Russian projects, such as South Stream, are not seen as a problem, however. The EU's growing demand for gas will make sure it has a market and the diversification of transport routes is a good in itself).

If the degree of insecurity associated with the 8 billion-euro ($10.3 billion) project coupled with the global financial crisis is making potential investors nervous, officials in Brussels remain serene. When pressed, they do point out, however, that should private investors balk, public lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank stand ready to step in.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Forward To The Past: Russia, Turkey, And Armenia's Faith

By Raffi K. Hovannisian

The recent race of strategic realignments reflects a real crisis in the world order and risks triggering a dangerous recurrence of past mistakes. Suffice the testimony of nearly all global and regional actors, which have quickly shifted gears and embarked on a collective reassessment of their respective strategic interests and, to that end, a diversification of policy priorities and political partnerships.

It matters little whether this geopolitical scramble was directly triggered by the Russian-Georgian war and the resulting collapse of standing paradigms for the Caucasus, or whether it crowned latently simmering scenarios in the halls of international power. The fact is that the great game -- for strategic resources, control over communications and routes of transit, and long-term leverage -- is on again with renewed vigor, self-serving partisanship, and duplicitous entanglement.

One of the hallmarks of this unbrave new world is the apparent reciprocal rediscovery of Russia and Turkey. Whatever its motivations and manifestations, Turkey's play behind the back of its trans-Atlantic bulwark and Russia's dealings at the expense of its "strategic ally" Armenia raise the specter of a replay of the events of more than 85 years ago, when Bolshevik Russia and a Kemalist Turkey not content with the legacy of the great Genocide and National Dispossession of 1915 partitioned the Armenian homeland in Molotov-Ribbentrop fashion and to its future detriment.

Time To Face Up Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh, in Armenian) was one of the territorial victims of this 1921 plot of the pariahs, as it was placed under Soviet Azerbaijani suzerainty together with Nakhichevan. That latter province of the historical Armenian patrimony was subsequently cleansed of its majority Armenian population, and then of its Armenian cultural heritage. As recently as December 2005, Azerbaijan (like Armenia, a member of the Council of Europe) completed the total, Taliban-style annihilation of the medieval Armenian cemetery at Jugha that contained thousands of unique cross-stones.

Nagorno-Karabakh, by contrast, was able to turn the tide on a past of genocide, dispossession, occupation and partition and defend its identity, integrity, and territory against foreign aggression. In 1991 -- long before Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia became buzzwords -- it declared its liberty, decolonization, and sovereignty in compliance with the Montevideo standards of conventional international law and with the Soviet legislation in force at that time.

Subsequent international recognition of Kosovo, on the one hand, and the later withholding of such recognition for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other, demonstrate that there exists no real rule of law applied evenly across the board. On the contrary, such decisions are dictated by vital interests that are rationalized by reference to selectively interpreted international legal principles of choice and exclusivist distinctions of fact which, in fact, make no difference.

It's time to face up to the farce -- and that goes for Moscow and Ankara too, judging by recent pronouncements by high-level officials. And if the two countries are driven by the desire for a strategic new compact, then at least their partners on the world stage should reshift gears and calibrate their policy alternatives accordingly. Iran, the United States, and its European allies might find here an objective intersection of their concerns.

What Is Needed Russia and Turkey must never again find unity of purpose at the expense of Armenia and the Armenian people. The track record of genocide, exile, death camps, and gulags is enough for all eternity.

These two important countries, as partners both real and potential, must respect the Armenian nation's tragic history, its sovereign integrity and modern regional role, and Nagorno-Karabakh's lawfully gained freedom and independence.

Football diplomacy is fine, but Turkey can rise to the desired new level of global leadership and local legitimacy only by dealing with Armenia from a "platform" of good faith and reconciliation through truth; lifting its illegal blockade of the republic and opening the frontier that it unilaterally closed, instead of using it as a bargaining tool; establishing diplomatic relations without preconditions and working through that relationship to build mutual confidence and give resolution to the many watershed issues dividing the two neighbors; accepting and atoning, following the brilliant example of post-World War II Germany, for the first genocide of the 20th century and the national dispossession that attended it; committing to rebuild, restore, and then celebrate the Armenian national heritage, from Mount Ararat and the medieval capital city of Ani to the vast array of churches, monasteries, schools, academies, fortresses, and other cultural treasures of the ancestral Armenian homelands; initiating and bringing to fruition a comprehensive program to guarantee the right of secure voluntary return for the progeny and descendants of the dispossessed to their places and properties of provenance; providing full civil, human, and religious rights to the Armenian community of Turkey, including the total abolition the infamous Article 301, which has served for so long as an instrument of fear, suppression, and even death with regard to those courageous citizens of good conscience who dare to proclaim the historical fact of genocide; and finally, exercising greater circumspection in voicing incongruous and unfounded allegations of "occupation" in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh's David-and-Goliath struggle for life and justice, lest someone remind Ankara about more appropriate and more proximate applications of that term.

As for Russia, true strategic allies consult honestly with each other and coordinate their policies pursuant to their common interests. They do not address one another by negotiating adverse protocols with third parties behind each other's back; they do not posture against each other in public or in private; and they do not try to intimidate, arm-twist, or otherwise pressure each other via the press clubs and newspapers of the world. Russia, too, must deal with Armenia in good faith, recognizing the full depth and breadth of its national sovereignty and the horizontal nature of their post-Soviet rapport, its right to pursue a balanced, robust, and integral foreign policy, as well as the nonnegotiability -- for any reason, including the sourcing and supervision of Azerbaijani oil -- of Nagorno-Karabakh's liberty, security, and self-determination.

The Armenian government, in turn, must of course also shoulder its share of responsibility for creating a region of peace and shared stability, mutual respect and open borders, domestic democracy, and international cooperation. An ancient civilization with a new state, Armenia's national interests can best be served by achieving in short order a republic administered by the rule of law and due process, and an abiding respect for fundamental freedoms, good governance, and fair elections, which, sadly, has not been the case to date.

Armenia urgently needs a new understanding with its neighbors that will preclude once and for all its being cast again in the role of either fool or victim.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. read also: Armenia: time for diplomacy Russia and Turkey: diplomatic struggle for Caucasus

Turkmen Gas Riches Revive Pipe Dreams

By Bruce Pannier

The announcement this week that Turkmen gas riches may exceed the West's wildest dreams is likely to focus attention back on pipeline projects that bypass Russia in pumping Caspian energy supplies to European markets.

White Stream, a pipeline first proposed by Ukrainian officials in 2005, is just one such project that looks set to come under the spotlight following a Western audit of a key gas field in Turkmenistan, which showed that the Central Asian country has enough reserves to become a "world-class" gas supplier. White Stream and proposed projects such as the trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines are aimed at enhancing Western energy independence by transporting Caspian gas supplies to Europe while skirting Russia.

"The interest and attention toward Turkmenistan will rise and we must expect even more heated competition for Turkmen gas," says Federico Bordonaro, a Rome-based energy analyst. "We will see how the European Union and United States are able to quickly react in such a way that the trans-Caspian, Nabucco, and White Stream pipelines will be more realistic."

But real work has yet to begin on any of those projects, which for now remain no more than pipe dreams. Indeed, the Caspian region still only has one route for energy exports that bypasses Russia: the relatively modest Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline.

White Stream aims to change that. Formerly known as the Georgia-Ukraine-European Union pipeline, White Stream would run 2,000 meters under the Black Sea, its preferred route going from Georgia to Ukraine's Crimean coast and on to Europe. Plans call for building in three phases with an eventual output of 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually.

With Europe's thirst for energy supplies expected to double over the next two decades, the need for such a project is increasingly obvious, says Giorgi Vashakmadze, White Stream's corporate development chief.

According to the results of a British company's survey on October 13, one Turkmen field, Yolotan-Osman, appears to have enough gas to become the world's fourth- or fifth-largest gas reserve. But to tap into it and other Turkmen resources, Vashakmadze says it will take a much more determined show of Western political will to persuade Caspian countries -- already wooed by markets in Russia, China, and Iran -- to back projects like White Stream.

"We have enormous riches in the Caspian,” Vashakmadze told RFE/RL before the gas audit results were announced. "We have a huge demand in Europe, and the issue is why it's not linked yet and why supplies from the Caspian to Europe have not been achieved at a level which would correspond to supply and demand."

Russian Influence
The obvious answer is Russia. The Caspian power for more than 100 years, Russia had a monopoly over the region's gas exports to Europe until the BTE’s completion in late 2006. And now, through its gas giant Gazprom, Moscow is backing South Stream, a pipeline that would pump Caspian gas via Russia to Italy.

Because of Russia's influence over former Soviet republics like Turkmenistan, many analysts see South Stream as the pipeline most likely to be built, even if Gazprom recently delayed its planned launch by two years to 2015. Vashakmadze acknowledges that both White Stream and Nabucco, which he calls complimentary projects, face major hurdles. "Russia does not seem to be irritated by [Caspian gas] deals related to China or maybe even with Pakistan or India [TAPI], but it shows a negative attitude toward deals going to Europe," he says.

Gazprom is currently seeking to increase the amounts of gas it buys from both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, eastern Caspian states with which it has long-term supply contracts. Those two countries have shown interest in alternative export routes but have only committed to the Russian one.

To win them over, Vashakmadze says Caspian countries will need to see concrete European interest for much larger amounts of gas and the possibility of unhindered and sufficiently low-risk transportation.

"These countries need to decide if they can afford to contradict what they understand is Russia's desire -- and would they do this for very small volumes -- for peanuts?" Vashakmadze says. "Is it worthwhile to irritate a neighbor and partner for something that really does not bring much benefit? Only in cases where countries can see that potential exports to Europe are sufficiently high, capable of providing a significant part of their future revenues, will they decide to go this way -- otherwise it is not worthwhile for them."
The EU currently sees the Nabucco project as a top priority. This month, however, the EU is considering according the same priority status to White Stream.

That would create an important multiplier effect. "This effect goes far beyond the simple result of establishing bigger combined potential capacity,"  Vashakmadze says. "A more important result is the dramatic reduction of perceived transportation risks, so important for governments in [the Caspian region] and potential upstream investors."

Planning For Conflict
Risk has risen, however, in the wake of the August war between Russia and Georgia. Some analysts, for example, have suggested that Ukraine's Crimea, the headquarters for Russia's Black Sea Fleet, could in the future become the object of a conflict between Moscow and Kyiv. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has called Crimea a possible "future South Ossetia," referring to the Georgian breakaway region that Russia says it defended against Georgian aggression.

An alternative, or possibly additional, route for White Stream includes a pipeline to Romania -- either directly from Georgia or from Crimea. White Stream would also make use of already-developed pipeline technology used in Blue Stream, a Russian pipeline to Turkey.

Vashakmadze says that while Russia has shown its willingness to influence the Caucasus, the conflict’s outcome may help push forward Nabucco and White Stream. He says an EU resolution passed on September 1 "cites very loudly the need to develop the alternative supply routes. This probably makes the countries in the Caspian much more confident.... Probably much more needs to be done, but this is the way for us to succeed."

Vashakmadze won't name the project's partners, but says they are "more than 10." He also says White Stream is in constant consultation with shippers and distributors and "all relevant parties who might have gas or might want to transport gas."

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

διαβάστε επίσης στην Πολιτική Προσέγγιση: Κεντρική Ασία , nCa: Massive Gas Reserves: Dangers Ahead for Turkmenistan

South Ossetia Floods European Rights Court With Georgia Cases

The European Court of Human Rights has received nearly 2,000 applications from South Ossetians complaining of illegal treatment at the hands of Georgia, the president of the court, Jean-Paul Costa, has said.

The complaints have been filed over the past two months, since Russia and Georgia went to war over the breakaway Georgian region on August 7.

They follow applications made by Georgia to the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights against Russia, accusing its neighbor of war crimes, including ethnic cleansing.

Russia has also made complaints to international courts against Georgia, and Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said last month Russia would help any citizens of South Ossetia wanting to make complaints against Georgia.

"There will be a massive increase in the workload of the court," Costa told Reuters. "We cannot just throw away these cases."

Asked if he thought Russia was part of a coordinated effort to overwhelm the court with applications, he said: "Yes, it's possible. It's difficult to say that it's obvious or it's likely. But it's possible."

The European Court of Human Rights also has two outstanding claims by Georgia against Russia, the first dating from 2007 and the second from the recent war. The 2007 case relates to allegations of forced expulsions of Georgians from Russia and is not expected to be completed until early next year. The other case, dealing with events in August, is only at the preliminary stage, Costa said.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Asia's new 'great game' is all about pipelines

 

TheStar.com | Opinion | Asia's new 'great game' is all about pipelines

γράφει ο John Foster

The quest for control of energy resources has been dubbed the "new great game" – a rivalry for pipeline routes to access energy resources in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.

It's a geopolitical game that is openly analyzed in U.S. think-tanks, widely reported in the Asian press but rarely commented upon in Canada. It began after the Soviet Union broke up and the five "Stans" of Central Asia became independent.

Recent reports have linked the conflict in Georgia with pipelines that bring oil and gas to Europe but the pipeline rivalry extends far beyond Georgia to the vast oil and gas resources of the Caspian region and Central Asia.

When the countries of Central Asia were part of the Soviet Union, their oil and gas flowed only to the north through Soviet-controlled pipelines. After the Soviet breakup in 1991, however, competing world powers began to explore ways to tap these enormous reserves and move them in other directions.

Pipelines are important today in the same way that railway building was important in the 19th century. They connect trading partners and influence the regional balance of power.

Both Georgia and Afghanistan are seen as energy bridges – transit routes for the export of land-locked hydrocarbons.

Washington has long promoted a gas pipeline south from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. It would pass through Kandahar.

Realistic or not, construction is planned to start in 2010, and Canadian Forces are committed until December 2011. Richard Boucher, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, said last year: "One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan," and to link South and Central Asia "so that energy can flow to the south."

Unwittingly or willingly, Canadian forces are supporting American goals.

The BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline that pass through Georgia to Turkey originate in Azerbaijan. Recently built, they are the jewels in the crown of U.S. strategy to secure energy resources that bypass Russia and reduce European dependence on pipelines from Russia.

Two Central Asian countries are rich in hydrocarbons. According to the International Energy Agency, Turkmenistan has the world's fourth largest reserves of natural gas, while Kazakhstan's oil reserves are said to be three times those of the North Sea. Turkmenistan exports virtually all its gas to Russia. Last year, the presidents of Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed on a new gas line north to expand the export system. Construction starts this summer.

China is tapping into Central Asia's treasure, too. There is a new pipeline that brings oil from Kazakhstan to China. And a gas pipeline is being built from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to China.

The rivalry continues with plans for new gas lines to Central Europe. The Russians plan a line under the Black Sea to Bulgaria called South Stream, and the EU backs a project called Nabucco that would supply gas via Turkey.

As well, Washington is pushing for new pipelines under the Caspian Sea that would link Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and the pipelines to Europe.

But Russia is blocking these plans. Boucher asserts that European energy security is important to the United States as well as to Europeans and that it "is based on having multiple sources."

The United States expresses great concern about European dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia. But Europe has imported energy from Russia for 40 years. It imports from the Middle East and Africa, too.

Is Russia less reliable? Much is made of Russia's temporary cuts in gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus, but these countries were enjoying highly subsidized gas (a hangover from the Soviet era) and refusing to pay full European border prices. In similar circumstances, what would Canadian energy suppliers do?

Energy has become an issue of strategic discussions at NATO. At recent NATO summits the United States sought to commit NATO to energy security activities, calling for NATO to guard pipelines and sea lanes.

Last year, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said energy security required "unprecedented international co-operation, ... protecting and maintaining the world's energy supply system."

NATO proposals could have enormous consequences for Canada. U.S. strategic thinking is to get other NATO countries involved in guarding the world's oil and gas supplies. Canada is in danger of being drawn into long-term military commitments relating to energy.

Recently, Defence Minister Peter MacKay told a Halifax talk show that Canadian troops were not in Afghanistan "specifically" to guard a pipeline, but "if the Taliban are attacking certain projects, then yes we will play a role."

Neither Afghanistan nor Georgia is a member of NATO, but both are transit countries in the new great game.

Energy geopolitics are worthy of public discussion. The rivalry for energy resources is a power game – and militarizing energy is a long-term recipe for disaster.

Why Russia’s response to Georgia was right

γράφει ο Sergei Lavrov

For some of those witnessing the fighting in the Caucasus over the past few days, the narrative is straightforward and easy. The plucky republic of Georgia, with just a few million citizens, was attacked by its giant eastern neighbour, Russia. Add to this all the stereotypes of the cold war era, and you are presented with a truly David and Goliath interpretation – with all its accompanying connotations of good and evil. While this version of events is being written in much of the western media, the facts present a different picture.

Let me be absolutely clear. This is not a conflict of Russia’s making; this is not a conflict of Russia’s choosing. There are no winners from this conflict. Hours before the Georgian invasion, Russia had been working to secure a United Nations Security Council statement calling for a renunciation of force by both Georgia and South Ossetians. The statement that could have averted bloodshed was blocked by western countries.

Last Friday, after the world’s leaders had arrived at the Beijing Olympics, Georgian troops launched an all-out assault on the region of South Ossetia, which has enjoyed de facto independence for more than 16 years. The majority of the region’s population are Russian citizens. Under the terms of the 1992 agreement to which Georgia is a party, they are afforded protection by a small number of Russian peacekeeping soldiers. The ground and air attack resulted in the killing of peacekeepers and the death of an estimated 1,600 civilians, creating a humanitarian disaster and leading to an exodus of 30,000 refugees. The Georgian regime refused to allow a humanitarian corridor to be established and bombarded a humanitarian convoy. There is also clear evidence of atrocities having been committed – so serious and systematic that they constitute acts of genocide.

There can be little surprise, therefore, that Russia responded to this unprovoked assault on its citizens by launching a military incursion into South Ossetia. No country in the world would idly stand by as its citizens are killed and driven from their homes. Russia repeatedly warned Tbilisi that it would protect its citizens by force if necessary, and its actions are entirely consistent with international law, including article 51 of the UN charter on the right of self-defence.

Russia has been entirely proportionate in its military response to Georgia’s attack on Russian citizens and peacekeepers. Russia’s tactical objective has been to force Georgian troops out of the region, which is off limits to them under international agreements. Despite Georgia’s assertion that it had imposed a unilateral ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers and supporting troops remained under continued attack – a fact confirmed by observers and journalists in the region. Russia had no choice but to target the military infrastructure outside the region being used to sustain the Georgian offensive. Russia’s response has been targeted, proportionate and legitimate.

Russia has been accused of using the conflict to try to topple the government and impose control over the country. This is palpable nonsense. Having established the safety of the region, the president has declared an end to military operations. Russia has no intention of annexing or occupying any part of Georgia and has again affirmed its respect for its sovereignty. Over the next few days, on the condition that Georgia refrains from military activity and keeps its forces out of the region, Russia will continue to take the diplomatic steps required to consolidate this temporary cessation of hostilities.

Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president, has stated that “unless we stop Russia, unless the whole world stops it, Russian tanks will go to any European capital tomorrow”, adding on a separate occasion that “it’s not about Georgia any more. It’s about America”. It is clear that Georgia wants this dispute to become something more than a short if bloody conflict in the region. For decision-makers in the Nato countries of the west, it would be worth considering whether in future you want the men and women of your armed services to be answerable to Mr Saakashvili’s declarations of war in the Caucasus.

Russia is a member of the Security Council, of the Group of Eight leading industrialised nations and partner with the west on issues as varied as the Middle East, Iran and North Korea. In keeping with its responsibilities as a world power and the guarantor of stability in the Caucasus, Russia will work to ensure a peaceful and lasting resolution to the situation in the region.

originally posted at Financial Times

Neocons Now Love International Law

γράφει ο Robert Parry

How can some justify the United States attacking Grenada or Nicaragua or Panama or Iraq or Serbia yet condemn the Russian involvement in Georgia? While major US news outlets may be comfortable wearing blinders that let them see only wrongdoing by others, the rest of the world views the outrage from Bush and the neocons over Russia as a stunning double standard.

It’s touching how American neoconservatives who have no regard for international law when they want to invade some troublesome country have developed a sudden reverence for national sovereignty.

Apparently, context is everything. So, the United States attacking Grenada or Nicaragua or Panama or Iraq or Serbia is justified even if the reasons sometimes don’t hold water or don’t hold up before the United Nations, The Hague or other institutions of international law.

However, when Russia attacks Georgia in a border dispute over Georgia’s determination to throttle secession movements in two semi-autonomous regions, everyone must agree that Georgia’s sovereignty is sacrosanct and Russia must be condemned.

US newspapers, such as the New York Times, see nothing risible about publishing a statement from President George W. Bush declaring that “Georgia is a sovereign nation and its territorial integrity must be respected.”

No one points out that Bush should have zero standing enunciating such a principle. Iraq also was a sovereign nation, but Bush invaded it under false pretenses, demolished its army, overthrew its government and then conducted a lengthy military occupation resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths.

The invasion of Iraq also wasn’t a spur of the moment decision. In the months after the 9/11 attacks, Bush proclaimed an exceptional right of the United States to invade any country that might become a threat to American security or to US global dominance. [For details, see Consortiumnews.com’s “Bush’s Grim Vision” or see our book, Neck Deep]

When asked questions about international law, Bush would joke: “International law? I better call my lawyer.”

The neocons’ contempt for international law goes back even further – to the 1980s and the illegal contra war against Nicaragua and the invasion of Panama. Only in the last few days have the neocons discovered an appreciation for multilateral institutions and the principles of non-intervention.

Despite this history, leading US newspapers don’t see hypocrisy. Instead, they have thrown open their pages to prominent neocons and other advocates of US-led invasions so these thinkers now can denounce Russia while not mentioning any contradictions.

originally posted at Byzantine Blog. Read the whole article here: 

update #1, 16/08/08: As things fall apart, by Max Bergmann, Democracy Arsenal:

... Perhaps the biggest foreign policy challenge for the next President is attempting to restore U.S. credibility and prestige around the world. McCain this week has shown exactly the wrong way to go about it. His recent over-the-top rhetoric about Georgia is exactly the wrong approach and reeks of the same neoconservative inspired thinking that emanated from Bush's first term. Making hollow promises and defiant threats, when the Bush administration just showed that such rhetoric to be completely hollow, only makes the U.S. look less credible (Of course, if McCain were actually serious about following through on his reckless rhetoric and militarily confronting Russia then that would not only be insane but would further imperil our superpower status)...

Σχετικά με τον πόλεμο στον Καύκασο...

... δεν θέλω να κάνω κανένα σχόλιο. Ούτε και να παρουσιάσω καμιά μακροσκελή ανάλυση, ικανοποιώντας έτσι την ματαιοδοξία μου ως "ειδήμονα" πάνω σε θέματα διεθνών σχέσεων. Ό,τι ήταν να ειπωθεί, έχει ειπωθεί και οτιδήποτε επιπλέον - νομίζω - περισσότερο κακό θα κάνει, παρά καλό. Εξάλλου, όπως είπε χαρακτηριστικά και ο Πρόεδρος Μεντβέντεφ: "ο σκοπός επετεύχθη..." ! Νέοι τάφοι ή ακόμη... καλλίτερα, νέα νεκροταφεία ανοίχτηκαν και θ' ανοιχτούν, για να υποδεχτούν όλους εκείνους που ήθελαν να ζήσουν αλλά στάθηκαν εμπόδιο στα σχέδια δυο-τριών τρελών της "παρέας της Τυφλίδας". Και είναι τόσο απλό.

Όμως, από αυτόν τον - όχι άδικο - παράλογο πόλεμο, βγήκε και κάτι καλό. Αποδείχτηκε πόσο έξυπνοι μπορούν να είναι οι Ευρωπαίοι όταν το θέλουν. Και αναφέρομαι στην διεύρυνση του ΝΑΤΟ προς τα ανατολικά. Τί θα είχε συμβεί αν η Γεωργία - μαζί με την Ουκρανία - είχαν ενταχθεί στη Συμμαχία και ξεσπούσε η κρίση, όπως και ξέσπασε;

Ενδεχομένως, θα είχαμε έναν γενικευμένο πόλεμο ανάμεσα στην "Δύση" και την "Ανατολή" όχι σε ένα, αλλά πιθανόν σε δεκάδες μέτωπα, με απρόβλεπτες συνέπειες που κανένας μας δεν θα ήθελε καν να φαντάζεται!

Ένα ερώτημα που θα μπορούσαμε να θέσουμε σε αυτό το σημείο ... έτσι ... αυθόρμητα ... οι Αμερικανοί - που επιθυμούσαν διακαώς την ένταξη Γεωργίας και Ουκρανίας στην Ατλαντική Συμμαχία - είχαν στα σχέδια τους ένα τέτοιο σενάριο πολέμου; Έναν  πόλεμο που θα είχε ως χώρο εκδήλωσής του τον ευρωπαϊκό χώρο για ακόμη μία φορά μέσα σε εκατό χρόνια;

Υπερβολές, θα απαντούσε κάποιος. Ανοησίες, ίσως, ν' απαντούσε κάποιος άλλος. Όμως, η ηγεσία των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών - απ' αυτά που διαβάζω και που διαβάζουμε όλοι μας - συμπεριφέρεται σαν να μην κατανοεί τι ακριβώς έχει συμβεί... Και  με δεδομένη  και γνωστή την εξωτερική τους πολιτική, που επιδιώκει την δημιουργία ή την ανάπτυξη κρίσεων εκεί που δεν υπάρχουν ή που δεν θα έπρεπε να υπάρχουν ή εκεί που θα μπορούσαν να αποφευχθούν πολύ φοβάμαι πως, ό,τι κι αν υποθέσουμε ούτε υπερβολικό θα είναι, ούτε ανόητο, ούτε λίγο...

update #1, 14/8/08: Όπως αναφέρει ο Μιχάλης Εγνατίου σε άρθρο του στο φύλλο της εφημερίδας  "Ημερησία"  της 12ης Αυγούστου, με τίτλο: H «εκδίκηση» του Κοσόβου:

... Tη μεγαλύτερη ευθύνη για τη σημερινή κατάσταση, φέρει η κυβέρνηση των Hνωμένων Πολιτειών. Aναμείχθηκε απροκάλυπτα στις εσωτερικές υποθέσεις του Kαυκάσου, όταν η Mόσχα ήταν πατημένη στη γη. Mόλις οι Pώσοι συνήλθαν από το σοκ που τους προκάλεσε εκείνη η αρρωστημένη μορφή κομμουνισμού που τους επιβλήθηκε, οι πάντες γνώριζαν πως θα απαιτούσαν την πρωτοκαθεδρία στην περιοχή. Δεν συμφέρει στις HΠA η σύγκρουση με τη Pωσία, απλά και μόνο επειδή δεν είναι σε θέση να την αντιμετωπίσει. Oσοι γνωρίζουν τον τρόπο δράσης και αντίδρασης της Mόσχας, δεν έχουν την παραμικρή αμφιβολία πως σύντομα θα ξανανοίξουν και το θέμα του Kοσσυφοπεδίου, ακόμα και αν οι HΠA κάνουν μερικά βήματα πίσω στον Kαύκασο. H θύελλα, που έρχεται, ούτε στην Oυάσιγκτον συμφέρει, πολύ περισσότερο ούτε στα Bαλκάνια...

update #2, 19/8/08:

Στο blog "scraps of Moscow", μπορείτε να βρείτε μία πολύ ενδιαφέρουσα συλλογή χαρτών του Καυκάσου, η οποία μπορεί να σας βοηθήσει να κατανοήσετε λίγο καλλίτερα την πολιτική γεωγραφία της περιοχής, αφού παρουσιάζει τις μεταβολές που έχουν πραγματοποιηθεί, μέχρι σήμερα, στα σύνορα των χωρών της περιοχής καθώς, και στην πληθυσμιακή σύνθεση τόσο της Γεωργίας όσο και της Οσσετίας και της Απχαζίας.

Το σύνδρομο της «παιδικής χαράς» στην εφαρμογή του Διεθνούς Δικαίου

α. Βαλκάνια: "η αιτία του κακού"

Ο «ορθολογισμός» της αμερικανικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής όπως, αυτός εκφράζεται με δηλώσεις του τύπου «…το Κόσσοβο αποτελεί μία και μοναδική περίπτωση, και η ανεξαρτησία του από την Σερβία - με τον τρόπο που αυτή υποβοηθήθηκε από τις ΗΠΑ & ΕΕ και εφαρμόστηκε, δεν αποτελεί προηγούμενο για ανάλογες «διευθετήσεις» σε παρόμοια ζητήματα πουθενά στον κόσμο…» μάλλον αγωνία περιγράφει, παρά πεποίθηση που βασίζεται σε λογικά επιχειρήματα και στους κανόνες του Διεθνούς Δικαίου, έγγραφους ή άγραφους…

Η αμερικανική εξωτερική πολιτική έχει επίγνωση των επιπτώσεων της παρέμβασής της στο Κοσσυφοπέδιο και αναγνωρίζει την συμβολή της στην αμφισβήτηση της διεθνούς νομιμότητας, προσπαθώντας να περιορίσει αυτές τις επιπτώσεις μέσα στα στενά όρια ενός - κατά πως φαίνεται - θνησιγενούς κρατικού μορφώματος, το οποίο δεν διαθέτει τα απαιτούμενα «υλικά» σύνθεσης, συνεργασίας άρα και ισότιμης συμμετοχής των διαφόρων εθνικών ή άλλων ομάδων πληθυσμού του, στην διακυβέρνηση στο εσωτερικό… κατ’ επέκταση και ισότιμης συμμετοχής στο διεθνές πεδίο.

Το μέλλον ενός λαού, το μέλλον ενός κράτους, δεν μπορεί να προσδιορίζεται και να εξαρτάται μόνον από τις οικονομικές ή άλλες επιδιώξεις τρίτων… «πατρόνων» θα τους χαρακτήριζα, που ευελπιστούν στην άνευ όρων διαχείριση των πλούσιων φυσικών πόρων ή στον απρόσκοπτο έλεγχο μιας ευρύτερης γεωγραφικής περιοχής, όπως και στην περίπτωση του Κοσόβου.

Αυτό, ασφαλώς το γνωρίζουν οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες. Ασφαλώς και το γνωρίζουν όλα τα κράτη-μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Το «ενδιαφέρον» για την «αναβάθμιση» των Σκοπίων, αιτιολογεί και διευρύνει τον γεωγραφικό ορίζοντα των παραπάνω επιδιώξεων. Όμως, το ζήτημα των Σκοπίων και η πιθανή ή μη ένταξή τους στο ΝΑΤΟ ή την ΕΕ, δεν θα μας απασχολήσει σε αυτό το άρθρο.

Όπως έχω δηλώσει κατ’ επανάληψη, καθώς η Ελλάδα - όπως στην προκειμένη περίπτωση - είναι η άμεσα ενδιαφερόμενη και καθ’ όσο διαρκεί η διαπραγματευτική διαδικασία επίλυσης του ζητήματος του ονόματος της γειτονικής χώρας και των παρελκόμενων αυτού, που συνιστούν αιτία αποσταθεροποίησης στην περιοχή των Βαλκανίων, υπάρχουν συγκεκριμένα πρόσωπα και όργανα που νομιμοποιούνται θεσμικά στην άσκηση της εξωτερικής μας πολιτικής. Θεωρώ πως κάθε άλλη παρέμβαση η οποία ενδεχομένως θα περιείχε μια υποψία υποστήριξης ή το αντίθετο στην άσκηση της από τον οποιονδήποτε, συμπεριλαμβανομένου και του γράφοντος, θα ήταν τουλάχιστον περιττή… έστω και αν θα χαρακτηριζόταν ως χρήσιμη. Επιμένω σε αυτή την άποψη και ελπίζω στην κατανόησή σας.

@

β. Η διεθνής πραγματικότητα αντιμέτωπη με τα διλήμματα που η ίδια δημιούργησε

Κάθε τι το οποίο πράττουμε και δεν νομιμοποιείται από συγκεκριμένους κανόνες ή αν αυτοί οι κανόνες δεν λαμβάνονται υπόψη και δεν υπάρξει αντίδραση σε αυτήστάση από την διεθνή κοινότητα, ως αποτέλεσμα θα έχουμε την χρήση του ίδιου ακριβώς σκεπτικού στην επίτευξη παρόμοιων επιδιώξεων, από τον οποιονδήποτε.

Η αλήθεια είναι, πως το διαρκώς μεταβαλλόμενο περιβάλλον - κυρίως οικονομικό - μέσα στο οποίο ζούμε, ενισχύει αποσχιστικές τάσεις και δεν επιτρέπει να αντιμετωπίζουμε τα πράγματα με προχειρότητα ή με ευσεβείς πόθους ή υποκειμενικές σκέψεις.

Παρόμοια ζητήματα, σαν αυτά του Κοσόβου, μπορούν να απαντηθούν σε διάφορα μέρη του κόσμου, τόσο στον ευρύτερο γεωγραφικό χώρο της Ευρώπης και εντός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, όσο και στην Εγγύς και την Άπω Ανατολή ή την Αφρική. Όμως, η μονομερής ανακήρυξη της ανεξαρτησίας του Κοσσόβου έχει συγκεκριμένα ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά, τα οποία δεν πρέπει σε καμία περίπτωση να παραβλέψουμε!

Το γεγονός ότι, αρκετές Ευρωπαϊκές και τρίτες χώρες στήριξαν και αναγνώρισαν ευθύς αμέσως την παράνομη και παράτυπη (με βάση το Διεθνές Δίκαιο) απόσχιση του Κοσσυφοπεδίου από την Σερβία, ουσιαστικά, νομιμοποίησε παρόμοιες περιπτώσεις οπουδήποτε στον κόσμο. Με δεδομένη όμως την αμφισβητούμενη οικονομική / κοινωνική / πολιτική / πολιτισμική βιωσιμότητα τέτοιων κρατικών μορφωμάτων, πώς η διεθνής κοινότητα θα μπορεί φέρει στους ώμους της το βάρος τέτοιων αποφάσεων και μάλιστα, του όποιου κόστους διατήρησης και συντήρησής τους; Κι αν το νεοσύστατο αυτό κρατικό μόρφωμα ή όπως αλλιώς θέλετε ονομάστε το, δεν τα καταφέρει να «επιβιώσει», τότε ποιος θα πληρώσει τη ζημιά; Επιπρόσθετα, ποιός θα μπορούσε να εγγυηθεί, στο ελάχιστο, την ευημερία των πολιτών του αλλά, και των λαών τριγύρω αυτού, γνωρίζοντας τον τρόπο με τον οποίο η «ανεξαρτησία» του επιτεύχθηκε; Παράλληλα, ποιός μπορεί να εγγυηθεί την αποτροπή ή έστω ελαχιστοποίηση πιθανών «παράπλευρων» κινδύνων αποσταθεροποίησης, όπως οι επακόλουθες εδαφικές διεκδικήσεις έναντι των γειτονικών κρατών, που συνηθίζονται σε τέτοιες περιπτώσεις; Εν πάση περιπτώσει, νομίζω, πρέπει να σοβαρευτούμε.

Και τα Σκόπια, αποτελούν ένα πρώτης τάξεως παράδειγμα που ενισχύει αυτόν τον προβληματισμό, αν αναλογιστούμε ότι ο πληθυσμός της χώρας δεν είναι ομοιογενής ούτε θρησκευτικά, ούτε εθνικά, ούτε ιστορικά, ούτε καν πολιτισμικά, ενώ προσπαθεί να «επιβιώσει», να αποκτήσει ταυτότητα και συνοχή με τον σφετερισμό χαρακτηριστικών και συμβόλων γειτονικού τους λαού, δηλαδή, εις βάρος αυτού του λαού, βάζοντας σε περιπέτειες και τον δικό τους!

Για να επιστρέψουμε όμως στην «αιτία του κακού», οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι συν αυτής, φαίνεται πως εξαπάτησαν την ηγεσία και τον λαό του Κοσσόβου σκόπιμα! Η πιο ενδεδειγμένη λύση, θα μπορούσε να είναι η ένταξη της Σερβίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, οπότε και το Κόσσοβο θα μπορούσε να απολαμβάνει τα οφέλη που θα προέκυπταν. Πλέον, κάτι τέτοιο φαντάζει αδύνατο! Άρα, από εδώ και στο εξής θα έχουμε ένα κράτος-υποχείριο οποιασδήποτε οικονομικής ή πολιτικής παρέμβασης από έξωθεν δυνάμεις. Έχω την αίσθηση ότι υπεδείχθη ανωριμότητα από πολλές χώρες στην προκειμένη περίπτωση, πλην των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, οι οποίες κατάφεραν να «βάλουν πόδι» για τα καλά στην Βαλκανική… άρα και στην Ευρώπη. Το πείραμα, μπορεί να χαρακτηριστεί επιτυχημένο!

Πολλοί εκφράζουν τον φόβο ότι, ανάλογες εξελίξεις μπορούμε να αναμένουμε στο μέλλον για περιοχές εντός της επικράτειας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

Πράγματι, είναι γνωστά σε όλους τα ζητήματα των Βάσκων στην Ισπανία ή των Φλαμανδών του Βελγίου. Δεν συμμερίζομαι αυτή την άποψη. Όχι γιατί δεν μπορεί να συμβεί, αλλά δεν έχει κανένα απολύτως νόημα σε μία Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση που διακρατική μεν, ενιαία δε ως θεσμική / οικονομική οντότητα, δίχως εσωτερικά σύνορα, δεν προσφέρει το ανάλογο περιβάλλον που θα μπορούσε να θρέψει αποσχιστικές τάσεις-λύσεις και μάλιστα βιώσιμες.

Λίγο πιο πέρα, έχουμε το ζήτημα της Νότιας Οσετίας, η οποία το 1990 κήρυξε μονομερώς την ανεξαρτησία της από την Γεωργία ενώ, μόλις προχθές για μία ακόμη φορά το Κοινοβούλιό της ζήτησε από τον ΟΗΕ, την Ρωσσία και την Ε.Ε. να αναγνωρίσουν την ανεξαρτησία της. Μέχρι στιγμής κανείς δεν έχει προχωρήσει στην αναγνώρισή της ως ανεξάρτητο κράτος. Δεν αποκλείεται όμως να επιτευχθεί η απόσχισή της σύντομα, αν αυτό εξυπηρετεί ευρύτερα συμφέροντα και όχι μόνον εκείνα του πληθυσμού της.

Το ελεύθερο, ανεξάρτητο και κυρίαρχο Κουρδιστάν. Αποτελεί πονοκέφαλο και για την Τουρκία και για τις υπόλοιπες χώρες της περιοχής με έντονο το Κουρδικό στοιχείο στο εσωτερικό τους. Αν και οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, θα επιθυμούσαν ένα ανεξάρτητο Κουρδικό κράτος μέσα στην καρδιά της Κεντρικής Ασίας, με σκοπό την πιο «βολική» διαχείριση των φυσικών της πόρων εν τούτοις, δεν έχουν αποφασίσει αν κάτι τέτοιο θα μπορούσε να εξυπηρετήσει καλλίτερα τα συμφέροντά της.

Γι’ αυτό άλλωστε, η Τουρκία έχει μείνει μόνη της στον αγώνα ενάντια των Κούρδων.Το Κουρδικό, δεν αποτελεί πρόβλημα εσωτερικής κοινωνικής συνοχής και ασφάλειας της Τουρκίας - όπως ισχυρίζεται - αλλά, βασικό ζήτημα εξωτερικής και οικονομικής πολιτικής καθώς, πιθανή ενίσχυση των Κούρδων στην ευρύτερη περιοχή και μάλιστα με δικό τους κράτος, θα έθετε σε κίνδυνο τον ηγεμονικό ρόλο της στην Κεντρική Ασία! Και σε αυτή την περίπτωση, η Τουρκία θα βρισκόταν μόνη της, απέναντι στις ΗΠΑ και την διεθνή κοινότητα, δεδομένου ότι η πολεμική της πολιτική δεν τυγχάνει αποδοχής, παρά ανοχής καθώς, προς το παρόν, δεν έχει αποσαφηνιστεί ο ρόλος που θα μπορούσαν να διαδραματίσουν οι Κούρδοι στο διεθνές πολιτικό / οικονομικό παιχνίδι.

Το παράδοξο, βρίσκεται στην επιδοκιμασία και αναγνώριση του δικαιώματος των Αλβανών του Κοσόβου για ανεξαρτησία, από την πλευρά της Τουρκίας καθώς, έτσι επιβεβαιώνει από μόνη της την νομιμότητα της επιθυμίας του Κουρδικού Λαού για ανεξαρτησία! Αρνούμενη να αποδεχθεί αυτή την πρώτου μεγέθους «γκάφα» της εξωτερικής της πολιτικής, θα χάσει σε αξιοπιστία και θα ενισχύσει τα σενάρια που θέλουν σύντομα τμήματα της Τουρκικής επικράτειας να ενσωματώνονται σε μια νέα κρατική οντότητα, με έντονο το Κουρδικό στοιχείο.

Υπάρχουν ένα σωρό συγκριτικά παραδείγματα, με σημείο αναφοράς το Κόσσοβο, που θα μπορούσαν να επιφέρουν ανάλογες εξελίξεις και μεταβολές στον παγκόσμιο χάρτη. Θα ήταν αδύνατο, μία τέτοια πιθανότητα, να μην αποτελεί καταστροφική προοπτική για την διατήρηση της διεθνούς νομιμότητας! Αυτή ασφαλώς, είναι η μία πλευρά των πραγμάτων.

Η άλλη πλευρά, υποδεικνύει την ανάγκη ακόμη περισσότερης δημοκρατίας, διασφάλιση του δικαιώματος της αυτοδιάθεσης εθνικών πληθυσμιακών ομάδων και μεταβολή συνόρων που ενδεχομένως, θα διάνοιγαν πιο ασφαλείς ενεργειακούς δρόμους. Η «μαγιά» χαλάει εκεί όπου κάποιος ή κάτι επιβάλλει την λογική αυτή όχι προς όφελος της διεθνούς κοινότητας, αλλά για την ικανοποίηση των δικών του και μόνο εθνικών(;) συμφερόντων! Άραγε, είναι τυχαίες οι «Ευρωπαϊκές παρεμβάσεις» των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, έπειτα από τις συνεχείς τους αποτυχίες στο Αφγανιστάν και το Ιράκ με το αιτιολογικό της καταπολέμησης της τρομοκρατίας;

Όπως σε όλα τα θέματα, έτσι κι εδώ, η αλήθεια βρίσκεται κάπου στη μέση. Ένα είναι σίγουρο. Θα πρέπει να συμφωνήσουμε σ’ ένα συγκεκριμένο θεσμικό πλαίσιο, το οποίο δεν θα αδικεί οποιοδήποτε κράτος, δεν θα θέτει σε κίνδυνο την εδαφική του ακεραιότητα και θα εξασφαλίζει το απαραβίαστο της εθνικής του κυριαρχίας! Παράλληλα, θα πρέπει να κατανοηθεί ότι η ανάγκη αυτοδιάθεσης εθνικών μειονοτήτων που ζουν εντός των ορίων μιας χώρας, μπορεί να υποστηριχθεί αν και εφόσον συντρέχουν ειδικοί και πολύ συγκεκριμένοι λόγοι, για τους οποίους η διεθνής κοινότητα (και όχι ένα κράτος ή ομάδα κρατών) μπορεί ν’ αναλάβει την ευθύνη της διευθέτησης του όλου ζητήματος, χωρίς να τίθεται σε κίνδυνο η κοινωνική συνοχή και η ειρήνη εντός, γύρω και πέρα των ορίων του συγκεκριμένου κράτους.

@

Χρήσιμο υλικό:

"Η νέα βαλκανιοποίηση των Βαλκανίων", Χριστίνα Κουλούρη, "Το Βήμα" 24 Φεβρουαρίου 2008
"Διπλή παραβίαση του Διεθνούς Δικαίου", Γ. Δημητρακόπουλος, "Ελευθεροτυπία" 2 Μαρτίου 2008
"Φρένο στις αποσχιστικές τάσεις", Θάνος Ντόκος, "Ελευθεροτυπία" 2 Μαρτίου 2008

wikipedia, "Έθνος", "Ελευθεροτυπία", "Le monde diplomatique"

update #1, 05/07/08:

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Seen Overplaying its Hand Along Its Borders in the Caucasus

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Caught Between Two Kinds of Russian Nationalism

update #2, 09/07/08:

Το ανεξάρτητο Κόσοβο και τα επικίνδυνα μεθεόρτια

update #3, 08/08/08, 21:10μμ:
Η ανανέωση έρχεται να συμπληρώσει την αναφορά στην διένεξη ανάμεσα στην Γεωργία και την αυτόνομη περιοχή της Ν. Οσετίας καθώς, σήμερα είχαμε εκτεταμένες πολεμικές επιχειρήσεις μεταξύ γεωργιανών και ρωσσικών στρατευμάτων, για το έλεγχο της περιοχής (λόγω της εισβολής των γεωργιανών δυνάμεων), με εκατοντάδες νεκρούς και τραυματίες. Ακόμη οι πληροφορίες είναι συγκεχυμένες και τα links που παραθέτω στην συνέχεια έχουν σκοπό να παρουσιάσουν όσο το δυνατόν πιο ολοκληρωμένα το ζήτημα στην εξέλιξή του.

Πιθανόν να επανέλθω στο θέμα τις επόμενες ημέρες με νεώτερη ανάρτηση και όχι με ανανέωση του ήδη υπάρχοντος υλικού, ανάλογα με τις εξελίξεις.

Russia Warns Georgia Over Breakaway South Ossetia
SOUTH OSSETIA CRISIS STOKES TENSION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GEORGIA
Russia Profile - South Ossetia Looks North
Russia and Georgia Come to Blows
Mεγάλης κλίμακας στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις στη Νότια Οσετία
Well, That Didn't Last Long--Fighting Resumes in the Caucasus
Troops move in to South Ossetia
Δραματικές ώρες στη Νότια Οσετία
Πολεμική αναμέτρηση Γεωργίας - Ρωσίας την ώρα της έναρξης των Ολυμπιακών Αγώνων
Στα πρόθυρα πολέμου!
Update on the Caucasus War