Η μεγάλη Έξοδος

Διαβάζοντας κανείς τον Ηρόδοτο ή τον Σένεκα, ανάμεσα σε τόσους άλλους, είναι αδύνατον να μην καταλήξει στο συμπέρασμα ότι μόνον οι ανόητοι καταφεύγουν στην ισχύ των όπλων για να αρπάξουν ό,τι πολύτιμο το πνεύμα τους αδυνατεί να συλλάβει έστω και σαν ψήγμα...

Οι ισλαμιστές δεν είναι μόνον κακοί, ανήθικοι και μοχθηροί άνθρωποι. Είναι και ανόητοι! Όπως ακριβώς οι μαϊμούδες δεν μπορούν να διακρίνουν την διαφορά διαμαντιού και πέτρας έτσι κι αυτοί, δεν είναι σε θέση να αντιληφθούν την έννοια και την αξία της κληρονομιάς που καλούνται να διαχειριστούν, εφόσον κατέκτησαν ή κατακτούν χώρους στους οποίους προηγουμένως άκμαζαν ανθρώπινες κοινωνίες και πολιτισμοί που πρόσφεραν τα μέγιστα στην ανθρωπότητα.

Όλοι μας έχουμε γίνει μάρτυρες των καταστροφών της ιστορικής και της πολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς των λαών της Ανατολής, από το Αφγανιστάν μέχρι την Μικρά Ασία, με υπεύθυνο πάντα τον ίδιο λαό και την ίδια θρησκεία: Τούρκους και Ισλάμ.

 

Οι Αρμένιοι σήμερα είναι υποχρεωμένοι να εγκαταλείψουν τις πατρογονικές τους εστίες - ας αποφύγουμε να εξετάσουμε το πως και γιατί, διότι τότε θα βρεθούμε στη δυσάρεστη θέση να μιλήσουμε για όλα όσα σκοπίμως παραβλέπουμε - και αφήνουν πίσω τους όνειρα, ελπίδες, κόπους και πόθους... τα νεκρά σώματα και τις ψυχές των παιδιών τους, κειμήλια και θησαυρούς... πλήθος εκκλησιών κι άλλων μνημείων που χρονολογούνται τουλάχιστον από τον 4ο αιώνα μ. Χ.! 

Μπορεί να φεύγουν με πόνο, όχι όμως σαν σκύλοι όπως τους χαρακτήρισε ο γνωστός για τον βίο και την πολιτεία του, πρόεδρος του Αζερμπαϊτζάν. Εγκαταλείπουν τα σπίτια τους με την αξιοπρέπεια του ηττημένου που σέβεται και τιμά την υπογραφή του, έστω και αν εξαναγκάστηκε σ’ αυτήν... ψιλά γράμματα που όλοι οι τουρκογενείς ούτε σέβονται, ούτε καταλαβαίνουν!

Εκ προοιμίου γνωρίζουμε τι θα συμβεί. Είπαμε, η Ιστορία είναι αμείλικτη απέναντι στους τούρκους. Σπίτια θα λεηλατηθούν, κόποι μιας ζωής θα καταστραφούν, ιερά και όσια θα βεβηλωθούν... πολλές από τις εκκλησίες και τα μοναστήρια θα γίνουν εστιατόρια, στάβλοι, αποθήκες, "πολιτιστικά κέντρα", τζαμιά και θα επιχειρηθεί να σβηστεί το χριστιανικό παρελθόν και ο χαρακτήρας της περιοχής. Ο τουρκικός πολιτισμός θα "θριαμβεύσει"...

Είναι αλήθεια, ακούμε κι ομιλούμε συχνά περί "τουρκικού" και "τουρκοϊσλαμικού πολιτισμού"... δεν έχει σχέση με τον μπακλαβά. Ό,τι κι αν σημαίνουν αυτοί οι όροι και παρά την εκτενή βιβλιογραφία κι αρθρογραφία και τις αμέτρητες "ενθουσιώδεις" διαλέξεις "ακαδημαϊκών" της γειτονικής μας χώρας, ο πολιτισμός της Ανατολής έχει χτιστεί πάνω στα συντρίμμια που άφηνε πίσω της η νομαδική λαίλαπα καθώς ισοπέδωνε τα πάντα στο πέρασμά της. Μην ξεχνάμε πως και ο ίδιος ο Κεμάλ, εξηγώντας το όραμά του, συνήθιζε να λέει πως «εμείς - οι τούρκοι δηλαδή - δεν έχουμε την πολυτέλεια του χρόνου που είχαν οι ευρωπαϊκοί λαοί στην δημιουργία Ιστορίας και πολιτισμού»...

Άρα, η καταστροφή και η διαστρέβλωση ήταν μονόδρομος! Όταν ένιωσαν λίγο πιο έξυπνοι, άρχισαν να μιμούνται τους ευρωπαίους μα και στην μίμηση απέτυχαν παταγωδώς. Ο μιμητισμός τους ξεπέρασε τα όρια του κιτς. Τότε ήταν που στράφηκαν προς την εμπορική εκμετάλλευση του πολιτισμικού πλούτου των εθνών που προϋπήρχαν και πράγματι, έβγαλαν πολύ χρήμα ενώ, παράλληλα, είχαν και την ευκαιρία να αμβλύνουν τις εντυπώσεις όλων εκείνων που επισκέπτονταν την Τουρκία ή το Αζερμπαϊτζάν και τις άλλες τουρκογενείς χώρες.

Όμως, μην ξεχνάμε και την θρησκευτική διάσταση. Το Ισλάμ ως ό,τι πιο τελευταίο υπάρχει δεν συγχωρεί τους πολιτισμούς εκείνους που δημιούργησαν και άφησαν το αποτύπωμά τους πάνω στη γη. Μισεί θανάσιμα τα έργα των ανθρώπων και των λαών που εξακολουθούν με θρασύτητα να υπάρχουν παρά τις γενοκτονίες και τις πολιτικές εκκαθάρισης.

Ο φθόνος που νιώθουν οι ισλαμιστές είναι τόσο εμφανής που όσο κι αν προσπαθούν να τον κρύψουν τόσο περισσότερο γελοιοποιούνται.

Θέλουν να μας πείσουν για το μεγαλείο της πίστης τους και την ισχύ τους όμως, σε ποιόν αλήθεια γίνονται πιστευτοί;

 

Οι φίλοι μας οι Αρμένοι, πονούν για ό,τι αφήνουν πίσω τους. Εγώ θα τους έλεγα να αφήσουν τον πόνο τους στην άκρη και να εύχονται οι Αζέροι να συμπεριφερθούν ως πραγματικοί τούρκοι που είναι! Ό,τι δοκιμάσουν, ό,τι αποπειραθούν και ό,τι κάνουν θα είναι η καλύτερη απόδειξη της αλήθειας! Θα δει και θα μάθει όλη η ανθρωπότητα ότι η "ευτυχία" του τούρκου βρίσκεται μέσα στην καταστροφή, την λεηλασία, την αρπαγή και την οδύνη. Θα δει και θα μάθει όλη η ανθρωπότητα το πραγματικό πρόσωπο του Ισλάμ και του ..."ισλαμικού πολιτισμού".

Ακολουθεί ο κατάλογος της ιστορικής και πολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς που οι Αρμένιοι "παραδίδουν" μαζί με τα εδάφη τους στους άπιστους:

• St. John the Baptist Church (1216-1238)

• Dadivank (4th century)

• Katoghike (9-11th century)

• Amaras Monastery (4th century)

• St. George of Tsitsernavank (4-5th)

• Gtchavank (4th-13th century)

• Yeghishe Apostle Monastery (Jrvshtik) (5th)

• White Cross of Vankasar (5th century)

• Dizapayt Kataro Monastery

• Holy Mother of God (5th century)

• Bread Bakery church (7-17 centuries)

• Okht Mokhrenisi Door Monastery (7-17th)

• St. Hakobavank Monastery in Kolatak (9th)

• The Holy Savior of Jori (9th century)

• St. Stephen of Tsmakahogh (9th-10th)

• Spitak Khach Monastery, Vank village, Hadrut (10th century)

• Chartar Yeghisha Kus Desert (12th round)

• St. George of Chankatagh (12th century)

• Khotavank (12-13th century)

• Karvachar Surb Astvatsatsin virgin desert (12-13th century)

• The Holy Savior of Paul (12th-13th centuries)

• Shoshkavank St. of Msmna

• Astvatsatsin (13th century)

• Horeka Monastery (13th century)

• Kavakavank (14th century)

• Gospel of St. Gayane the Virgin in the Desert (1616)

• Holy Resurrection of Hadrut (1621)

• Pirumashen (1641)

• Holy Mother of God of the Gospel (1651)

• St. Stephen of the Cross (1654)

• Shoshi New Church (1655)

• Holy Pandaleon of Berdadzor (Paris Pigeon) (1658)

• Ghondiants Desert of Moshkhmhat (1658)

• Haki St. Minas (1673)

• Church of St. Gregory of Herher (1676)

• The Holy Mother of God of Tsaghkavank, Tsakuri (1682)

• Yeritsmankants Monastery (1691)

• Masrik Church of Kashunik (1694)

• Desert Holy Savior (Napat) (17th century)

• Hochants St. Stepanos (17th century)

• Bovurkhan Monastery Complex (17th century)

• St. John the Baptist of Togh (1736)

• Holy Virgin of Khnatsakh (1740)

• St. Stephen of Padara (18th)

• Holy Mother of God of Mushkapat (18th century)

• Surb Astvatsatsin of Dashushen (1843)

• St. John the Baptist of Shushi (1847)

• The Holy Virgin of Nngi (1853)

• St. John Garabed of Martakert (1857)

• The Holy Mother of God of Aygestan (1860)

• The Holy Virgin Karin Dag (1862)

• Holy Savior of Shushi (1868-1887)

• Ashan Surb Astvatsatsin (1896)

• St. George of Astghashen (1898)

• St. George of Mataghis (1898)

• Holy Mother of God of Talish (19th century)

• Holy Savior of the Garmeragoudj (19th century)

• Holy Mother of God of Karaglkh (19th century)

• St. John the Baptist of Nor Shen (19th century)

• Holy Mother of God of Haghorti (19th)

• Holy Mother of God of Khnushinak (19th)

• Surb Astvatsatsin of Kolkhozashen (19th century)

• Holy Translators of Kaghartsi (19th)

• Surb Astvatsatsin of Lusadzor (19th)

• Holy Savior of Sarushen (19th)

• Surb Astvatsatsin of Karmir village (19th)

• St. Stephen of Khachen (19th century)

• St. Hripsime of Berdadzor (19th century)

• Surb Astvatsatsin of Nerkin Horatagh (1904)

• Holy Mother of God of the Apostle (1907)

• The Holy Ascension of Berdzor (1998)

• Holy Martyrs of Aghavno (2002)

• Holy Mother of God of Askeran (2002)

• St. Nerses the Great of Martuni (2004)

• Holy Garabed of Yeghtsahogh (2006)

• St. Sargis of Harutyunagomer (2006)

• St. Anton of Zaglik (2007)

• Holy Garabed of Nerkin Horatagh (2012)

• Holy Mother of God of Vaghuhas (2012)

• St. John the Baptist of Karaglkh (2013)

• St. George of Mets Shen (2013)

• Chartar St. Vardanants (2018)

 

Οργή στην Αρμενία για την οδυνηρή συμφωνία με το Αζερμπαϊτζάν

Η συνθηκολόγηση που υπέγραψε η Αρμενία με το εγκληματικό καθεστώς του Αζερμπαϊτζάν δικαίως έχει εξοργίσει κι έχει βυθίσει στο πένθος τον αρμένικο λαό. Κι αυτό, είναι κάτι που το καταλαβαίνω απόλυτα. Καταλαβαίνω επίσης και τα μέσα ενημέρωσης, που κάνουν λόγο για "οδυνηρή συμφωνία" και "προδοσία" του Πρωθυπουργού της χώρας Νιγκόλ Πασινιάν. Όμως, ο Πασινιάν έπραξε το αυτονόητο. Έσωσε ανθρώπινες ζωές' μαζί και την αξιοπρέπεια του λαού του Αρτσάχ. Τόσο ο ίδιος όσο κι ο Πρόεδρος του Αρτσάχ, Αραγίκ Χαρουτγιουνιάν, στην δική μου αντίληψη τουλάχιστον, αναδείχθηκαν ως οι πλέον ηρωϊκές μορφές της αντίστασης απέναντι στον φασισμό των τουρκοϊσλαμιστών.

 

Πόσο να άντεχε το μικρό κι "ασήμαντο" Αρτσάχ των 150000 ανθρώπων του; Πόσο να άντεχε η Αρμενία μόνη της... στ' αλήθεια μόνης της; Κανείς δεν στήριξε πραγματικά τον αγώνα τους. Όλοι μα όλοι σφύριζαν αδιάφορα στον όλεθρο και τον θάνατο που έσπερναν οι τουρκοαζέρικες δυνάμεις και οι περιφερόμενοι ισλαμιστές τρομοκράτες. Τα έχουμε δει και τα έχουμε ζήσει κατ' επανάληψη. Την γνωρίζουμε την ιστορία και την πορεία των πραγμάτων. Ξανά και ξανά τα ίδια. Κανείς δεν μίλησε ποτέ για τα εγκλήματα των μουσουλμάνων πολέμαρχων της Βοσνίας εις βάρος των χριστιανικών πληθυσμών της περιοχής. Κανείς δεν μίλησε για τα αίσχη των τουρκαλβανών στο Κοσσυφοπέδιο, των Τατάρων της Κριμαίας ή τις τρομοκρατικές επιθέσεις των Τσετσένων. Κανείς δεν ορθώνει το ανάστημα του απέναντι στον τουρκο-ισλαμισμό... τη λέπρα που σαπίζει το σώμα της ανθρωπότητας!

 

Πότε οι ισλαμιστές απολογήθηκαν για τα εγκλήματά τους; Από την άλλη, πότε η "πολιτική ορθότητα" αναγνώρισε το δίκαιο των λαών της περιοχής μας; Ποτέ. Πολύ σύντομα ακολουθεί η Κύπρος και λίγο αργότερα εμείς. Αλλά, μέχρι τότε, θα εξακολουθούμε να ζούμε με σχετική ασφάλεια και θα εκφράζουμε άποψη επί του παντός, πιστεύοντας πως προσθέτουμε κι εμείς το κατιτίς μας.

 

Καταλαβαίνω τον κάθε Αρμένιο και την κάθε Αρμένισσα! Έχουν κάθε λόγο να αισθάνονται προδομένοι. Κάθε συνθηκολόγηση είναι πικρή. Κάθε συμβιβασμός, κάθε αναδίπλωση, κάθε απώλεια πονάει πολύ περισσότερο από τις πληγές και τα τραύματα που αποκτώνται στο πεδίο της μάχης. Όμως, με την συμφωνία αυτή σώζονται χιλιάδες ζωές και υπό αυτές τις συνθήκες, τούτο αποτελεί μέγιστη επιτυχία!

EU Fights For Nabucco's Future

By Ahto Lobjakas

BRUSSELS -- The fate of the Nabucco pipeline project appears to be hanging by a thread. No EU official would publicly admit this, but the signs tell their own story. First, as a senior EU official told reporters in Brussels on November 4 on condition of anonymity, transit talks with Turkey have stalled. Second, Azerbaijan is dithering between competing Russian and EU bids for its gas exports, which are crucial to bringing Nabucco on line in 2012 as planned. Third, in the long term, Azerbaijani gas alone will not be sufficient. The EU official said that "other countries in the region" must supply most of the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas Nabucco is expected to carry by 2020.

But Iran, with the world's second-largest reserves, remains off-limits as long as it continues to enrich uranium. And Turkmenistan, with its enormous export potential, has yet to decide whether to invest in a trans-Caspian pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan -- and Nabucco. The common thread for all these countries, and the EU as the ultimate beneficiary of the 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline, is the question of intent and commitment.

EU Makes Its Case
On November 5-7, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will visit Turkey and Azerbaijan to demonstrate the bloc's continued commitment to Nabucco.

"The first objective of this trip is to show the political commitment of the European Commission to the Nabucco project and to reaffirm once more that we are convinced that it is going to be online according to the planned timetable," says Piebalgs' spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas.

The Russian-Georgian conflict sent shock waves through the region and among potential investors. But official Brussels remains steadfast in the belief that Nabucco is safe from Moscow's interference. "Russia would jeopardize its reputation as a reliable supplier" to the EU if it acted in any way to damage Nabucco, said one official.

However, none of Nabucco's essential building blocks is currently in place. Turkey continues to hold out for a better transit deal while Azerbaijan has yet to formally commit its gas exports to the project. Tarradellas says that while Piebalgs' visit is a sign that the EU is upping the ante in its talks with the two countries. "We're going to discuss also the remaining differences with the Turks and the question of the transit of the gas through Turkey," he says, "and then we're going to be visiting Azerbaijan, which will be probably be the first supplier of gas for the Nabucco pipeline."

The senior EU official who spoke on condition of anonymity said that, apart from charging a transit fee, Turkey wants to divert 15 percent of Nabucco's gas for cheap domestic use. As Azerbaijan is insisting on selling its gas at European market rates minus transit costs, the Nabucco consortium and its subsidiaries in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria would be left to pick up the tab. Piebalgs is keen to break the deadlock before the end of the year. In Turkey this week he will meet with the country's president, prime minister, foreign minister, and economy minister.

Where Will Gas Come From?
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has yet to decide to whom to sell the estimated 7-9 bcm of gas it is able to export annually in the early years of Nabucco's operations. The senior Brussels official said EU companies are pitted against Russian competitors. There are fears in the EU that Russian political pressure could clinch the deal for Russian bidders. A decision is expected sometime in 2009.

EU officials say that the fact that Piebalgs has secured a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a sign of "interest" on the part of Baku in doing business with the EU. But Azerbaijan's gas reserves, even if supplemented by the planned expansion of the Shah Deniz field, will not be sufficient to keep Nabucco in business.

And this is where Nabucco currently hits a wall. Iran will remain untouchable  in trade terms as long as it refuses to cease uranium enrichment. Like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be swayed by Moscow's cash -- or outright pressure. And even if Turkmenistan's recently confirmed reserves of 14 trillion bcm dwarf Russia's own transit capacity, Moscow will be seeking to deny the EU a piece of the pie.
Piebalgs is hoping to soon visit Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, his aides say. This leaves Iraq and Egypt as the only other viable regional suppliers for Nabucco -- with one extremely unstable and the other rather remote.

Meanwhile, EU officials reject suggestions Nabucco could eventually carry Russian gas diverted south. This, they say, would defeat the purpose of Nabucco -- which is to diversify supplies. (Competing Russian projects, such as South Stream, are not seen as a problem, however. The EU's growing demand for gas will make sure it has a market and the diversification of transport routes is a good in itself).

If the degree of insecurity associated with the 8 billion-euro ($10.3 billion) project coupled with the global financial crisis is making potential investors nervous, officials in Brussels remain serene. When pressed, they do point out, however, that should private investors balk, public lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank stand ready to step in.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Forward To The Past: Russia, Turkey, And Armenia's Faith

By Raffi K. Hovannisian

The recent race of strategic realignments reflects a real crisis in the world order and risks triggering a dangerous recurrence of past mistakes. Suffice the testimony of nearly all global and regional actors, which have quickly shifted gears and embarked on a collective reassessment of their respective strategic interests and, to that end, a diversification of policy priorities and political partnerships.

It matters little whether this geopolitical scramble was directly triggered by the Russian-Georgian war and the resulting collapse of standing paradigms for the Caucasus, or whether it crowned latently simmering scenarios in the halls of international power. The fact is that the great game -- for strategic resources, control over communications and routes of transit, and long-term leverage -- is on again with renewed vigor, self-serving partisanship, and duplicitous entanglement.

One of the hallmarks of this unbrave new world is the apparent reciprocal rediscovery of Russia and Turkey. Whatever its motivations and manifestations, Turkey's play behind the back of its trans-Atlantic bulwark and Russia's dealings at the expense of its "strategic ally" Armenia raise the specter of a replay of the events of more than 85 years ago, when Bolshevik Russia and a Kemalist Turkey not content with the legacy of the great Genocide and National Dispossession of 1915 partitioned the Armenian homeland in Molotov-Ribbentrop fashion and to its future detriment.

Time To Face Up Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh, in Armenian) was one of the territorial victims of this 1921 plot of the pariahs, as it was placed under Soviet Azerbaijani suzerainty together with Nakhichevan. That latter province of the historical Armenian patrimony was subsequently cleansed of its majority Armenian population, and then of its Armenian cultural heritage. As recently as December 2005, Azerbaijan (like Armenia, a member of the Council of Europe) completed the total, Taliban-style annihilation of the medieval Armenian cemetery at Jugha that contained thousands of unique cross-stones.

Nagorno-Karabakh, by contrast, was able to turn the tide on a past of genocide, dispossession, occupation and partition and defend its identity, integrity, and territory against foreign aggression. In 1991 -- long before Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia became buzzwords -- it declared its liberty, decolonization, and sovereignty in compliance with the Montevideo standards of conventional international law and with the Soviet legislation in force at that time.

Subsequent international recognition of Kosovo, on the one hand, and the later withholding of such recognition for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other, demonstrate that there exists no real rule of law applied evenly across the board. On the contrary, such decisions are dictated by vital interests that are rationalized by reference to selectively interpreted international legal principles of choice and exclusivist distinctions of fact which, in fact, make no difference.

It's time to face up to the farce -- and that goes for Moscow and Ankara too, judging by recent pronouncements by high-level officials. And if the two countries are driven by the desire for a strategic new compact, then at least their partners on the world stage should reshift gears and calibrate their policy alternatives accordingly. Iran, the United States, and its European allies might find here an objective intersection of their concerns.

What Is Needed Russia and Turkey must never again find unity of purpose at the expense of Armenia and the Armenian people. The track record of genocide, exile, death camps, and gulags is enough for all eternity.

These two important countries, as partners both real and potential, must respect the Armenian nation's tragic history, its sovereign integrity and modern regional role, and Nagorno-Karabakh's lawfully gained freedom and independence.

Football diplomacy is fine, but Turkey can rise to the desired new level of global leadership and local legitimacy only by dealing with Armenia from a "platform" of good faith and reconciliation through truth; lifting its illegal blockade of the republic and opening the frontier that it unilaterally closed, instead of using it as a bargaining tool; establishing diplomatic relations without preconditions and working through that relationship to build mutual confidence and give resolution to the many watershed issues dividing the two neighbors; accepting and atoning, following the brilliant example of post-World War II Germany, for the first genocide of the 20th century and the national dispossession that attended it; committing to rebuild, restore, and then celebrate the Armenian national heritage, from Mount Ararat and the medieval capital city of Ani to the vast array of churches, monasteries, schools, academies, fortresses, and other cultural treasures of the ancestral Armenian homelands; initiating and bringing to fruition a comprehensive program to guarantee the right of secure voluntary return for the progeny and descendants of the dispossessed to their places and properties of provenance; providing full civil, human, and religious rights to the Armenian community of Turkey, including the total abolition the infamous Article 301, which has served for so long as an instrument of fear, suppression, and even death with regard to those courageous citizens of good conscience who dare to proclaim the historical fact of genocide; and finally, exercising greater circumspection in voicing incongruous and unfounded allegations of "occupation" in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh's David-and-Goliath struggle for life and justice, lest someone remind Ankara about more appropriate and more proximate applications of that term.

As for Russia, true strategic allies consult honestly with each other and coordinate their policies pursuant to their common interests. They do not address one another by negotiating adverse protocols with third parties behind each other's back; they do not posture against each other in public or in private; and they do not try to intimidate, arm-twist, or otherwise pressure each other via the press clubs and newspapers of the world. Russia, too, must deal with Armenia in good faith, recognizing the full depth and breadth of its national sovereignty and the horizontal nature of their post-Soviet rapport, its right to pursue a balanced, robust, and integral foreign policy, as well as the nonnegotiability -- for any reason, including the sourcing and supervision of Azerbaijani oil -- of Nagorno-Karabakh's liberty, security, and self-determination.

The Armenian government, in turn, must of course also shoulder its share of responsibility for creating a region of peace and shared stability, mutual respect and open borders, domestic democracy, and international cooperation. An ancient civilization with a new state, Armenia's national interests can best be served by achieving in short order a republic administered by the rule of law and due process, and an abiding respect for fundamental freedoms, good governance, and fair elections, which, sadly, has not been the case to date.

Armenia urgently needs a new understanding with its neighbors that will preclude once and for all its being cast again in the role of either fool or victim.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. read also: Armenia: time for diplomacy Russia and Turkey: diplomatic struggle for Caucasus

Asia's new 'great game' is all about pipelines

 

TheStar.com | Opinion | Asia's new 'great game' is all about pipelines

γράφει ο John Foster

The quest for control of energy resources has been dubbed the "new great game" – a rivalry for pipeline routes to access energy resources in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.

It's a geopolitical game that is openly analyzed in U.S. think-tanks, widely reported in the Asian press but rarely commented upon in Canada. It began after the Soviet Union broke up and the five "Stans" of Central Asia became independent.

Recent reports have linked the conflict in Georgia with pipelines that bring oil and gas to Europe but the pipeline rivalry extends far beyond Georgia to the vast oil and gas resources of the Caspian region and Central Asia.

When the countries of Central Asia were part of the Soviet Union, their oil and gas flowed only to the north through Soviet-controlled pipelines. After the Soviet breakup in 1991, however, competing world powers began to explore ways to tap these enormous reserves and move them in other directions.

Pipelines are important today in the same way that railway building was important in the 19th century. They connect trading partners and influence the regional balance of power.

Both Georgia and Afghanistan are seen as energy bridges – transit routes for the export of land-locked hydrocarbons.

Washington has long promoted a gas pipeline south from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. It would pass through Kandahar.

Realistic or not, construction is planned to start in 2010, and Canadian Forces are committed until December 2011. Richard Boucher, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, said last year: "One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan," and to link South and Central Asia "so that energy can flow to the south."

Unwittingly or willingly, Canadian forces are supporting American goals.

The BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline that pass through Georgia to Turkey originate in Azerbaijan. Recently built, they are the jewels in the crown of U.S. strategy to secure energy resources that bypass Russia and reduce European dependence on pipelines from Russia.

Two Central Asian countries are rich in hydrocarbons. According to the International Energy Agency, Turkmenistan has the world's fourth largest reserves of natural gas, while Kazakhstan's oil reserves are said to be three times those of the North Sea. Turkmenistan exports virtually all its gas to Russia. Last year, the presidents of Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed on a new gas line north to expand the export system. Construction starts this summer.

China is tapping into Central Asia's treasure, too. There is a new pipeline that brings oil from Kazakhstan to China. And a gas pipeline is being built from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to China.

The rivalry continues with plans for new gas lines to Central Europe. The Russians plan a line under the Black Sea to Bulgaria called South Stream, and the EU backs a project called Nabucco that would supply gas via Turkey.

As well, Washington is pushing for new pipelines under the Caspian Sea that would link Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and the pipelines to Europe.

But Russia is blocking these plans. Boucher asserts that European energy security is important to the United States as well as to Europeans and that it "is based on having multiple sources."

The United States expresses great concern about European dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia. But Europe has imported energy from Russia for 40 years. It imports from the Middle East and Africa, too.

Is Russia less reliable? Much is made of Russia's temporary cuts in gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus, but these countries were enjoying highly subsidized gas (a hangover from the Soviet era) and refusing to pay full European border prices. In similar circumstances, what would Canadian energy suppliers do?

Energy has become an issue of strategic discussions at NATO. At recent NATO summits the United States sought to commit NATO to energy security activities, calling for NATO to guard pipelines and sea lanes.

Last year, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said energy security required "unprecedented international co-operation, ... protecting and maintaining the world's energy supply system."

NATO proposals could have enormous consequences for Canada. U.S. strategic thinking is to get other NATO countries involved in guarding the world's oil and gas supplies. Canada is in danger of being drawn into long-term military commitments relating to energy.

Recently, Defence Minister Peter MacKay told a Halifax talk show that Canadian troops were not in Afghanistan "specifically" to guard a pipeline, but "if the Taliban are attacking certain projects, then yes we will play a role."

Neither Afghanistan nor Georgia is a member of NATO, but both are transit countries in the new great game.

Energy geopolitics are worthy of public discussion. The rivalry for energy resources is a power game – and militarizing energy is a long-term recipe for disaster.

Do Azerbaijan's Ethnic Minorities Face Forced Assimilation?

γράφει η Liz Fuller

Over the past 10 days, representatives of ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan have issued two separate public statements affirming their fear of assimilation and soliciting international support. Azerbaijani commentators have dismissed those appeals as unfounded and orchestrated by Moscow.

The ethnic groups in question are the Avars, Tsakhurs, and Lezgins, and according to official statistics together they constitute less than 1 percent of Azerbaijan's total population of 8.65 million. They live compactly in several districts of northern Azerbaijan bordering on the Russian Federation. Avars are the largest ethnic group in neighboring Daghestan, where they account for approximately 29 percent of the population, and Lezgins the third largest (13 percent). The Tsakhurs, who number around 8,000, constitute less than 0.5 percent of Daghestan's population.

Estimates of the number of Lezgins in Azerbaijan range from 178,000 to 400,000 or even 850,000. Azerbaijan's Lezgins have lobbied sporadically for greater protection of their rights since the early 1980s; some Lezgins in both Daghestan and Azerbaijan have gone so far as to propose creating an independent state that would encompass their historic homeland to the north and south of the Samur River that forms the border between Russia and Azerbaijan. A conference on the Lezgins organized in Moscow last month under the aegis of the Russian Foreign Ministry was construed by some Azerbaijani commentators as possibly heralding a new Lezgin separatist threat.

On June 16, the website rossia3.ru posted an appeal "To all people of good will" signed by eight separate organizations representing the Avars, Lezgins, and Tsakhurs. One of those organizations is the Imam Shamil Avar National Front headed by Dagneft President and Russian State Duma Deputy Gadji Makhachev, who many observers believe has close ties with, and on occasion acts on orders from, the Kremlin.

The appeal deplored the fact that the creation in 1918 of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic effectively split the ancestral homeland of the three ethnic groups, and that during the seven decades that those lands were part of the USSR, they were subjected to "nightmarish" discrimination. It claimed that they were the only ethnic minorities in the entire Soviet Union who were obliged to pay for secondary and higher education. It further argued that Azerbaijan's secession in 1991 from the USSR was illegal as it was not preceded by a referendum, in which they would have voted against (Armenia was in fact the only Soviet republic to comply with the referendum requirement), and that "twice during the 20th century Azerbaijan occupied our homeland and unlawfully seized power there."

The appeal claimed that the leadership of the newly independent Azerbaijan Republic then embarked on the systematic annihilation of the three ethnic groups, sending "tens of thousands" of young men to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh, of whom "thousands" were killed. (That figure is difficult to reconcile with official population figures.) Members of the intelligentsia from all three ethnic groups were allegedly thrown into prison, and Azerbaijanis from other regions of Azerbaijan or from Georgia resettled in their abandoned homes in what the appeal terms a systematic "Turkicization" process. Those resettlers allegedly hold most official posts in the districts where the three groups constitute the majority of the population. The most recent crackdown was in March 2008 against the predominantly Lezgin population of the Kusar and Khachmas raions of Azerbaijan. The appeal concluded by requesting help in clarifying what has happened to those arrested and support for the creation of autonomous regions for the three groups.

Two days later, on June 18, the Daghestan-based Avar National Council, which was not a signatory to the June 16 appeal, addressed an open letter to Daghestan's President Mukhu Aliyev (himself an Avar) to "protect" Azerbaijan's Avar minority from the threat of "genocide," kavkaz-uzel.ru reported. The agency quoted Magomed Guseinov, a leading Council member, as estimating the size of Azerbaijan's Avar minority at 200,000, and the number of Avars currently imprisoned in Azerbaijan at almost 300. Guseinov repeated the claim that in the Zakatala, Belokany, and Kakh raions Azeris, mostly resettlers from the Naxcivan Autonomous Republic, occupy most prominent political posts even though they account for just 27 percent of the population. He contrasts the plight of the Avars in Azerbaijan unfavorably with that of Daghestan's Azerbaijani minority, which at the time of the 2002 Russian Federation census numbered 111,656 people, or approximately 4 percent of the republic's population. As one of Daghestan's 14 titular nationalities, the Azeris have the right to radio broadcasts and education in their native language.

Guseinov recalled that during a visit to Baku in late April 2007, President Aliyev discussed the plight of Azerbaijan's Avars with President Ilham Aliyev, who declared on that occasion that the Avars have no grounds for complaint and accused unnamed "forces" of seeking to stir up unrest among Azerbaijan's ethnic minorities. Mukhu Aliyev is scheduled to visit Azerbaijan again on June 26.

Meanwhile, political scientist Vafa Quluzade, who served as an adviser to Ilham Aliyev's late father Heydar, was quoted by kavkaz-uzel.ru on June 19 as accusing Russia of deliberately seeking to fuel disaffection among Azerbaijan's Avar, Lezgin, and Tsakhur minorities on the eve of a visit to Baku by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Quluzade suggested the objective is to coerce Azerbaijan into accepting a recent offer from Gazprom to buy natural gas from Azerbaijan's offshore Shah Deniz field. A commentary published on June 19 in the online daily zerkalo.az similarly argued that separatism on the part of the Lezgins, the Kurds, and the Talysh (who live in the southern districts of Azerbaijan bordering on Iran) constitutes a very real threat to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, and compared the Lezgins in Azerbaijan with the Ossetian population of the breakaway Georgian republic of South Ossetia.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Notice: The opinions expressed in this post does not necessarily reflect the opinion and the policies of this blog

useful links:

The Kurds and the Caucasus

The Yezidi Kurds' tribes & clans of south Caucasus

Azerbaijan infringe on the rights of Russians

The treatment of Representatives

The new conflict in the Caucasus

Lezgins orientation

Assessment for Lezgins in Azerbaijan

Lezgins

Tsakhur people

Tsakhurs

The Tsakhurs

The Avars

Eurasian Avars

Talyshistan

Ethnic Diversity

Jewish community in former USSR under threat of assimilation