Οι τάσεις υπερεπέκτασης της Τουρκίας

γράφει ο Βαγγέλης Χωραφάς

 

Οι κινήσεις και οι επιδιώξεις της Άγκυρας σε Συρία, Λιβύη και Ναγκόρνο Καραμπάχ, έχουν εξετασθεί από πολλούς αναλυτές τα τελευταία τρία χρόνια. Τα τρία αυτά μέτωπα παραμένουν ανοικτά από την Τουρκία, η οποία τα εντάσσει σε ένα ευρύτερο πλαίσιο διαπραγμάτευσης της με τη Δύση.

Το τελευταίο διάστημα, η Τουρκία έχει αρχίσει να διευρύνει την ήδη υπάρχουσα δραστηριοποίηση της και σε άλλες περιοχές: Κεντρική Ασία, Μέση Ανατολή, Αφρική.

Ωστόσο, το μέλλον της Τουρκίας και οι σχέσεις της με την Δύση θα κριθούν στη Μεσόγειο. Και εκεί η Ελλάδα θα πρέπει να έχει λόγο. Οι τελευταίες εξελίξεις αφορούν τις ακόλουθες περιοχές:

Αφγανιστάν 

Η υπόθεση του Αφγανιστάν παραμένει ανοικτή για την Άγκυρα η οποία προσπαθεί να εκμεταλλευτεί την αποχώρηση του ΝΑΤΟ και τις αδυναμίες της κυβέρνησης των Ταλιμπάν ως σημείο καμπής για την αύξηση της επιρροής της στην χώρα.

Στον βαθμό που οι Ταλιμπάν δεν αποδέχονται την ανάπτυξη τακτικού τουρκικού στρατού στο έδαφος του Αφγανιστάν, η Άγκυρα προσπαθεί να ξεπεράσει το πρόβλημα με την ανάπτυξη μισθοφόρων.

Η τουρκική ιδιωτική εταιρεία μισθοφόρων SADAT στρατολογεί Σύρους μισθοφόρους για το Αφγανιστάν με τον ίδιο τρόπο που το έκανε για την Συρία και το Ναγκόρνο Καραμπάχ. Ο αρχικός σχεδιασμός προέβλεπε 2.000 μισθοφόρους για τον Σεπτέμβριο, αλλά φαίνεται ότι έχει ακυρωθεί λόγω του ότι η διαπραγμάτευση με τους Ταλιμπάν παραμένει ανοικτή.

Το βασικό θέμα στην υπόθεση του Αφγανιστάν είναι ότι η Τουρκία δεν μπορεί να αποκτήσει πρόσβαση στην χώρα, χωρίς την διαμεσολάβηση του Πακιστάν ή του Κατάρ. Η Τουρκία εξακολουθεί να θεωρείται χώρα του ΝΑΤΟ, παρά τις προσπάθειες που έχει καταβάλει η Άγκυρα να αλλάξει την εικόνα της και το αφήγημα της για την συμμετοχή της στην 20ετή Νατοϊκή επέμβαση στη χώρα.

Η Άγκυρα θεωρεί ότι η ανάπτυξη μισθοφόρων στο Αφγανιστάν με κύρια αποστολή την ασφάλεια του αεροδρομίου της Καμπούλ, θα δημιουργήσει ευνοϊκές συνθήκες για την επέκταση των Turkish Airlines στην περιοχή, θα ευνοήσει την οικονομική διείσδυση τουρκικών εταιρειών στη χώρα και θα βοηθήσει την προβολή ισχύος στην Κεντρική Ασία. Παράλληλα, θα ενισχύσει την Τουρκία στην διαπραγμάτευση που διεξάγει με τις ΗΠΑ για τον ρόλο της στους διεθνείς συσχετισμούς.

Υεμένη

Καθώς η Τουρκία συνεχίζει να εδραιώνει την παρουσία της στην Υεμένη, η μυστική της υπηρεσία ΜΙΤ, έχει αρχίσει να στρατολογεί και να αναπτύσσει Σύρους μισθοφόρους στη χώρα. Παράλληλα, έχει διαμορφώσει στενούς δεσμούς με το κόμμα Al Islah το οποίο θεωρείται ως παρακλάδι της Μουσουλμανικής Αδελφότητας. Οι ηγέτες του κόμματος Al Yadomi και Mohammed Al Ajlan βρίσκονται σε εξορία στην Κωνσταντινούπολη.

Οι Σύροι μισθοφόροι φαίνεται να αναπτύσσονται στην επαρχία Chabwa για να αντιμετωπίσουν τους αντάρτες Χούτι μαζί με τον κυβερνητικό στρατό. Πηγές από την Υεμένη υποστηρίζουν ότι οι μισθοφόροι ήδη έλαβαν μέρος στην μάχη του Marib μαζί με τουρκικά drones.

Η στρατολόγηση από την ΜΙΤ συνεχίζεται στα κέντρα Al-Jabwani και Taez τα οποία χρηματοδοτούνται από το Κατάρ. Ταυτόχρονα δραστηριοποιούνται στην χώρα η θρησκευτική διεύθυνση Diyanet, η αναπτυξιακή υπηρεσία ΤΙΚΑ και η ΜΚΟ Insani Yardim Vakfi, ένα προκάλυμμα της ΜΙΤ.

Η Άγκυρα θεωρεί ότι με τις κινήσεις αυτές θα μπορέσει να βελτιώσει τις σχέσεις της με την Σαουδική Αραβία και θα δημιουργήσει ρωγμές στο μέτωπο των μοναρχιών του Κόλπου που κινείται εναντίον της.

Αρμενία

Η συμφιλίωση ανάμεσα στην Τουρκία και στην Αρμενία θα αποτελέσει καταλύτη ευρύτερων γεωπολιτικών εξελίξεων στον Καύκασο. Δεν έχει δρομολογηθεί ακόμα μια νέα περίοδος στις σχέσεις των δύο χωρών, αλλά εμφανίζονται κάποια πρώτα σημάδια εξομάλυνσης μέσα από τις δηλώσεις του Ταγίπ Ερντογάν και του Αρμένιου πρωθυπουργού Νικόλ Πασινιάν.

Εκτός από τις πολιτικές δηλώσεις, υπάρχουν και άλλα σημεία που υποδηλώνουν επαφές μεταξύ των δύο χωρών. Πρώτον, έχει επιτραπεί στην αεροπορική εταιρεία της Τουρκίας Turkish Airlines να εκτελεί δρομολόγια προς το Μπακού, χρησιμοποιώντας τον εναέριο χώρο της Αρμενίας. Δεύτερον, η Τουρκία φαίνεται διατεθειμένη να ανοίξει τα σύνορα της με την Αρμενία, στον βαθμό που έχει εξαφανιστεί από το τραπέζι η αξίωση για μια Μεγάλη Αρμενία. Το άνοιγμα των συνόρων θα βοηθήσει την Άγκυρα να αποκτήσει καλύτερη σύνδεση με το Αζερμπαϊτζάν.

Για την υλοποίηση αυτών των αλλαγών θα πρέπει να συνυπολογιστούν μια σειρά από παράγοντες. Πρώτον, ποια στάση θα κρατήσει το Αζερμπαϊτζάν, δηλαδή αν θα συναινέσει ή αν θα προσπαθήσει, όπως έκανε στο παρελθόν, να υπονομεύσει την προσέγγιση Άγκυρας-Ερεβάν. Δεύτερον, ποια θα είναι η τελική στάση της Μόσχας, η οποία σε πρώτη φάση βλέπει θετικά την προσέγγιση των δύο χωρών. Τρίτον, η Αρμενία θα προτιμούσε το θέμα να λύνονταν με διμερείς διαπραγματεύσεις με την Τουρκία. Τέταρτον, η Άγκυρα θα προτιμούσε το θέμα να λυθεί στα πλαίσια της πρωτοβουλίας «3+3», την περιφερειακή πλατφόρμα Αρμενίας, Αζερμπαϊτζάν, Γεωργίας μαζί με τις Τουρκία, Ρωσία και Ιράν.

Μαρόκο

Πριν από λίγες ημέρες ένα τουρκικής κατασκευής drone παραδόθηκε στο Μαρόκο. Πρόκειται για το πρώτο από τα δώδεκα drones που η Άγκυρα στέλνει στο Ραμπάτ, στα πλαίσια της συμφωνίας που είχε υπογραφεί τον περασμένο Απρίλιο.

Το Μαρόκο θα χρησιμοποιήσει τα drones ενάντια στο Μέτωπο Πολισάριο, το οποίο το καλοκαίρι ενίσχυσε τις θέσεις του στη Δυτική Σαχάρα. Παράλληλα, η απόκτηση drones από το Μαρόκο ασκεί πιέσεις στην Αλγερία, η οποία έχει εισέλθει σε μια νέα φάση έντασης με το Ραμπάτ.

Αλγερία

Η Αλγερία αποτελεί εμπορικό εταίρο της Τουρκίας, αλλά όχι στρατηγικό εταίρο, στον βαθμό που η Άγκυρα έχει βλέψεις στον Ατλαντικό. Η Αλγερία, όπως και η Αίγυπτος, εξακολουθεί να μην έχει στρατιωτικές σχέσεις με την Τουρκία, σε αντίθεση με την Λιβύη, την Τυνησία και τώρα το Μαρόκο.

Πριν από λίγες ημέρες ο πρόεδρος της χώρας Abdelmadjid Tebboune έστειλε μηνύματα προς το Παρίσι για την επιθυμία της Αλγερίας να προχωρήσει σε μια στρατηγική συνεργασία με την Τουρκία. Αυτές οι δηλώσεις είναι αποτέλεσμα των τεταμένων σχέσεων με την Γαλλία, μετά την διαφαινόμενη έλλειψη βούλησης από την πλευρά του Παρισιού να διευθετηθεί το θέμα της ιστορίας και της κοινής μνήμης μεταξύ των δύο χωρών.

Ρουάντα - Ουγκάντα

Η τουρκική παρουσία στην Αφρική διευρύνεται συστηματικά. Τον Σεπτέμβριο, η Άγκυρα έκανε κινήσεις για να προωθήσει τα προϊόντα της τουρκικής αμυντικής βιομηχανίας στην Ρουάντα. Αντιπροσωπεία στην οποία συμμετείχαν οι μεγαλύτερες βιομηχανίες Aselsan, Havelsan, Otokar και STM επισκέφθηκαν την χώρα.

Ο στόχος της Άγκυρας είναι να ενισχύσει την στρατιωτική συνεργασία με την Ρουάντα, η οποία διαθέτει ετοιμοπόλεμες ένοπλες δυνάμεις. Συμμετέχουν σε αποστολές διατήρησης της ειρήνης στην Κεντροαφρικανική Δημοκρατία, στο Νότιο Σουδάν και στη Σομαλία. Επιπλέον, μετά από αίτημα του προέδρου της Μοζαμβίκης Filipe Nyusi προς τον ομόλογο του της Ρουάντα Paul Kagame, εκστρατευτικό σώμα της Ρουάντα πολεμά κατά των ισλαμιστών ανταρτών στην επαρχία Cabo Delgado της Μοζαμβίκης.

Η Τουρκία προμηθεύει με στρατιωτικό υλικό την Σομαλία εδώ και πολλά χρόνια, η Ουγκάντα έχει αγοράσει ελαφρά στρατιωτικά οχήματα από την Katmerciler, ενώ ακολουθεί και η Κένυα.

Η Άγκυρα καταβάλει μεγάλη προσπάθεια να δημιουργήσει έναν άξονα επιρροής από την Σομαλία μέχρι την Ουγκάντα και η Ρουάντα αποτελεί το κομμάτι που λείπει σε αυτό το σύνθετο γεωπολιτικό σκηνικό.

Δυτική Αφρική

Λίγο πριν από το καλοκαίρι, το τουρκικό ΥΠΕΞ έδωσε είκοσι υποτροφίες σε σπουδαστές από το Τόγκο. Πρόκειται για κίνηση που συνιστά σημαντικό μοχλό επιρροής από την Τουρκία.

Παρόμοιες υποτροφίες έχουν προσφερθεί στην Σενεγάλη και στη Νιγηρία, δύο χώρες στις οποίες η Άγκυρα έχει εδραιώσει ισχυρή παρουσία.

Ο στόχος της Άγκυρας είναι η διείσδυση στην Δυτική και στην Υποσαχάρια Αφρική, μέσα από την χρησιμοποίηση ενός δικτύου πρεσβειών, εμπορικών αντιπροσωπειών και απευθείας πτήσεων.

Ο οικονομικός ανταγωνισμός με την Κίνα σε αυτές τις περιοχές, εκτός από τα όποια οικονομικά οφέλη, δίνει στην Άγκυρα και μοχλούς πίεσης στην διαπραγμάτευση της με την Δύση.

Νίγηρας

Ο Νίγηρας ενδιαφέρεται για τον εκσυγχρονισμό της πολεμικής του αεροπορίας και της αντιαεροπορικής του άμυνας.

Πριν από λίγες ημέρες μια αποστολή της Turkish Aerospace Industries βρέθηκε στη Νιαμέι, προσφέροντας το εκπαιδευτικό αεροσκάφος Hurkus, καθώς και τα Anka drones, της οποίας το τελευταίο μοντέλο εξοπλίζεται με πυραύλους.

Δεν άργησε να ακολουθήσει η Baykar η οποία πρόσφερε το Bayraktar TB2, το ίδιο μοντέλο drone που παραλαμβάνει και το Μαρόκο και το οποίο έχει δοκιμαστεί στο μέτωπο της Λιβύης.

Η Τουρκία ανταγωνίζεται τα Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα για οικονομική επιρροή στο Νίγηρα, ενώ η διαμάχη για την χρησιμοποίηση του παλιού φρουρίου Madama έχει λήξει χωρίς νικητή. Ταυτόχρονα, ανταγωνίζεται την Αίγυπτο που συζητά με το Νίγηρα για το ενδεχόμενο δημιουργίας στρατιωτικής βάσης στην χώρα, στον τομέα των εξοπλισμών και της στρατιωτικής επιρροής.

Η Τουρκία υπερεπεκτείνεται, ενώ την ίδια στιγμή η Δύση είναι επιφυλακτική απέναντι της. Η μείωση του ενδιαφέροντος των ΗΠΑ για την περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, της Βόρειας Αφρικής και της Μέσης Ανατολής και η στροφή τους προς τον Ινδο-Ειρηνικό, δεν διαμορφώνει ένα ελεύθερο πεδίο δράσης για την Άγκυρα.

Η Γαλλία, οι χώρες της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου και του Κόλπου με την επιτήρηση των ΗΠΑ διαμορφώνουν ένα πρώτο πλαίσιο ανάσχεσης των κινήσεων της Άγκυρας. Πολλοί θεωρούν ότι η υπερεπέκταση της Άγκυρας έχει φτάσει στο τέλος της. Στην πραγματικότητα το μέλλον της Τουρκίας αφορά τρία κύρια μέτωπα, την Συρία, την Λιβύη και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, όλα τα άλλα είναι δευτερεύοντα.

Το μέτωπο της Συρίας αφορά τις σχέσεις και την διαπραγμάτευση της Ρωσίας με τις ΗΠΑ. Η Τουρκία δεν μπορεί να έχει τον κύριο λόγο. Το ίδιο ισχύει σε μεγάλο βαθμό και με την Λιβύη, αν και εκεί μπλέκονται και τρίτες δυνάμεις.

Το μέτωπο της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου αποτελεί μία εσωτερική υπόθεση της Δύσης. Η τουρκική «Γαλάζια Πατρίδα» αρθρώνεται κυρίως γύρω από την Κύπρο και τις ΑΟΖ των χωρών της περιοχής και οι ΗΠΑ δεν πρόκειται να αφήσουν την Άγκυρα να κινηθεί με τους όρους της.

Το Ισραήλ και η Αίγυπτος βρίσκονται εδώ. Η Γαλλία διευρύνει την παρουσία της στην περιοχή υπογράφοντας αμυντικές συμφωνίες με Ελλάδα και Κύπρο και κινώντας τις διαδικασίες για την δημιουργία ευρωπαϊκού στρατού. Το θέμα είναι που βρίσκεται η Ελλάδα. Αν θα είναι ενεργητικός ή παθητικός παίκτης στην περιοχή.

 

EU Fights For Nabucco's Future

By Ahto Lobjakas

BRUSSELS -- The fate of the Nabucco pipeline project appears to be hanging by a thread. No EU official would publicly admit this, but the signs tell their own story. First, as a senior EU official told reporters in Brussels on November 4 on condition of anonymity, transit talks with Turkey have stalled. Second, Azerbaijan is dithering between competing Russian and EU bids for its gas exports, which are crucial to bringing Nabucco on line in 2012 as planned. Third, in the long term, Azerbaijani gas alone will not be sufficient. The EU official said that "other countries in the region" must supply most of the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas Nabucco is expected to carry by 2020.

But Iran, with the world's second-largest reserves, remains off-limits as long as it continues to enrich uranium. And Turkmenistan, with its enormous export potential, has yet to decide whether to invest in a trans-Caspian pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan -- and Nabucco. The common thread for all these countries, and the EU as the ultimate beneficiary of the 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline, is the question of intent and commitment.

EU Makes Its Case
On November 5-7, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will visit Turkey and Azerbaijan to demonstrate the bloc's continued commitment to Nabucco.

"The first objective of this trip is to show the political commitment of the European Commission to the Nabucco project and to reaffirm once more that we are convinced that it is going to be online according to the planned timetable," says Piebalgs' spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas.

The Russian-Georgian conflict sent shock waves through the region and among potential investors. But official Brussels remains steadfast in the belief that Nabucco is safe from Moscow's interference. "Russia would jeopardize its reputation as a reliable supplier" to the EU if it acted in any way to damage Nabucco, said one official.

However, none of Nabucco's essential building blocks is currently in place. Turkey continues to hold out for a better transit deal while Azerbaijan has yet to formally commit its gas exports to the project. Tarradellas says that while Piebalgs' visit is a sign that the EU is upping the ante in its talks with the two countries. "We're going to discuss also the remaining differences with the Turks and the question of the transit of the gas through Turkey," he says, "and then we're going to be visiting Azerbaijan, which will be probably be the first supplier of gas for the Nabucco pipeline."

The senior EU official who spoke on condition of anonymity said that, apart from charging a transit fee, Turkey wants to divert 15 percent of Nabucco's gas for cheap domestic use. As Azerbaijan is insisting on selling its gas at European market rates minus transit costs, the Nabucco consortium and its subsidiaries in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria would be left to pick up the tab. Piebalgs is keen to break the deadlock before the end of the year. In Turkey this week he will meet with the country's president, prime minister, foreign minister, and economy minister.

Where Will Gas Come From?
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has yet to decide to whom to sell the estimated 7-9 bcm of gas it is able to export annually in the early years of Nabucco's operations. The senior Brussels official said EU companies are pitted against Russian competitors. There are fears in the EU that Russian political pressure could clinch the deal for Russian bidders. A decision is expected sometime in 2009.

EU officials say that the fact that Piebalgs has secured a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a sign of "interest" on the part of Baku in doing business with the EU. But Azerbaijan's gas reserves, even if supplemented by the planned expansion of the Shah Deniz field, will not be sufficient to keep Nabucco in business.

And this is where Nabucco currently hits a wall. Iran will remain untouchable  in trade terms as long as it refuses to cease uranium enrichment. Like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be swayed by Moscow's cash -- or outright pressure. And even if Turkmenistan's recently confirmed reserves of 14 trillion bcm dwarf Russia's own transit capacity, Moscow will be seeking to deny the EU a piece of the pie.
Piebalgs is hoping to soon visit Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, his aides say. This leaves Iraq and Egypt as the only other viable regional suppliers for Nabucco -- with one extremely unstable and the other rather remote.

Meanwhile, EU officials reject suggestions Nabucco could eventually carry Russian gas diverted south. This, they say, would defeat the purpose of Nabucco -- which is to diversify supplies. (Competing Russian projects, such as South Stream, are not seen as a problem, however. The EU's growing demand for gas will make sure it has a market and the diversification of transport routes is a good in itself).

If the degree of insecurity associated with the 8 billion-euro ($10.3 billion) project coupled with the global financial crisis is making potential investors nervous, officials in Brussels remain serene. When pressed, they do point out, however, that should private investors balk, public lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank stand ready to step in.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Forward To The Past: Russia, Turkey, And Armenia's Faith

By Raffi K. Hovannisian

The recent race of strategic realignments reflects a real crisis in the world order and risks triggering a dangerous recurrence of past mistakes. Suffice the testimony of nearly all global and regional actors, which have quickly shifted gears and embarked on a collective reassessment of their respective strategic interests and, to that end, a diversification of policy priorities and political partnerships.

It matters little whether this geopolitical scramble was directly triggered by the Russian-Georgian war and the resulting collapse of standing paradigms for the Caucasus, or whether it crowned latently simmering scenarios in the halls of international power. The fact is that the great game -- for strategic resources, control over communications and routes of transit, and long-term leverage -- is on again with renewed vigor, self-serving partisanship, and duplicitous entanglement.

One of the hallmarks of this unbrave new world is the apparent reciprocal rediscovery of Russia and Turkey. Whatever its motivations and manifestations, Turkey's play behind the back of its trans-Atlantic bulwark and Russia's dealings at the expense of its "strategic ally" Armenia raise the specter of a replay of the events of more than 85 years ago, when Bolshevik Russia and a Kemalist Turkey not content with the legacy of the great Genocide and National Dispossession of 1915 partitioned the Armenian homeland in Molotov-Ribbentrop fashion and to its future detriment.

Time To Face Up Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh, in Armenian) was one of the territorial victims of this 1921 plot of the pariahs, as it was placed under Soviet Azerbaijani suzerainty together with Nakhichevan. That latter province of the historical Armenian patrimony was subsequently cleansed of its majority Armenian population, and then of its Armenian cultural heritage. As recently as December 2005, Azerbaijan (like Armenia, a member of the Council of Europe) completed the total, Taliban-style annihilation of the medieval Armenian cemetery at Jugha that contained thousands of unique cross-stones.

Nagorno-Karabakh, by contrast, was able to turn the tide on a past of genocide, dispossession, occupation and partition and defend its identity, integrity, and territory against foreign aggression. In 1991 -- long before Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia became buzzwords -- it declared its liberty, decolonization, and sovereignty in compliance with the Montevideo standards of conventional international law and with the Soviet legislation in force at that time.

Subsequent international recognition of Kosovo, on the one hand, and the later withholding of such recognition for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other, demonstrate that there exists no real rule of law applied evenly across the board. On the contrary, such decisions are dictated by vital interests that are rationalized by reference to selectively interpreted international legal principles of choice and exclusivist distinctions of fact which, in fact, make no difference.

It's time to face up to the farce -- and that goes for Moscow and Ankara too, judging by recent pronouncements by high-level officials. And if the two countries are driven by the desire for a strategic new compact, then at least their partners on the world stage should reshift gears and calibrate their policy alternatives accordingly. Iran, the United States, and its European allies might find here an objective intersection of their concerns.

What Is Needed Russia and Turkey must never again find unity of purpose at the expense of Armenia and the Armenian people. The track record of genocide, exile, death camps, and gulags is enough for all eternity.

These two important countries, as partners both real and potential, must respect the Armenian nation's tragic history, its sovereign integrity and modern regional role, and Nagorno-Karabakh's lawfully gained freedom and independence.

Football diplomacy is fine, but Turkey can rise to the desired new level of global leadership and local legitimacy only by dealing with Armenia from a "platform" of good faith and reconciliation through truth; lifting its illegal blockade of the republic and opening the frontier that it unilaterally closed, instead of using it as a bargaining tool; establishing diplomatic relations without preconditions and working through that relationship to build mutual confidence and give resolution to the many watershed issues dividing the two neighbors; accepting and atoning, following the brilliant example of post-World War II Germany, for the first genocide of the 20th century and the national dispossession that attended it; committing to rebuild, restore, and then celebrate the Armenian national heritage, from Mount Ararat and the medieval capital city of Ani to the vast array of churches, monasteries, schools, academies, fortresses, and other cultural treasures of the ancestral Armenian homelands; initiating and bringing to fruition a comprehensive program to guarantee the right of secure voluntary return for the progeny and descendants of the dispossessed to their places and properties of provenance; providing full civil, human, and religious rights to the Armenian community of Turkey, including the total abolition the infamous Article 301, which has served for so long as an instrument of fear, suppression, and even death with regard to those courageous citizens of good conscience who dare to proclaim the historical fact of genocide; and finally, exercising greater circumspection in voicing incongruous and unfounded allegations of "occupation" in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh's David-and-Goliath struggle for life and justice, lest someone remind Ankara about more appropriate and more proximate applications of that term.

As for Russia, true strategic allies consult honestly with each other and coordinate their policies pursuant to their common interests. They do not address one another by negotiating adverse protocols with third parties behind each other's back; they do not posture against each other in public or in private; and they do not try to intimidate, arm-twist, or otherwise pressure each other via the press clubs and newspapers of the world. Russia, too, must deal with Armenia in good faith, recognizing the full depth and breadth of its national sovereignty and the horizontal nature of their post-Soviet rapport, its right to pursue a balanced, robust, and integral foreign policy, as well as the nonnegotiability -- for any reason, including the sourcing and supervision of Azerbaijani oil -- of Nagorno-Karabakh's liberty, security, and self-determination.

The Armenian government, in turn, must of course also shoulder its share of responsibility for creating a region of peace and shared stability, mutual respect and open borders, domestic democracy, and international cooperation. An ancient civilization with a new state, Armenia's national interests can best be served by achieving in short order a republic administered by the rule of law and due process, and an abiding respect for fundamental freedoms, good governance, and fair elections, which, sadly, has not been the case to date.

Armenia urgently needs a new understanding with its neighbors that will preclude once and for all its being cast again in the role of either fool or victim.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. read also: Armenia: time for diplomacy Russia and Turkey: diplomatic struggle for Caucasus

Turkmen Gas Riches Revive Pipe Dreams

By Bruce Pannier

The announcement this week that Turkmen gas riches may exceed the West's wildest dreams is likely to focus attention back on pipeline projects that bypass Russia in pumping Caspian energy supplies to European markets.

White Stream, a pipeline first proposed by Ukrainian officials in 2005, is just one such project that looks set to come under the spotlight following a Western audit of a key gas field in Turkmenistan, which showed that the Central Asian country has enough reserves to become a "world-class" gas supplier. White Stream and proposed projects such as the trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines are aimed at enhancing Western energy independence by transporting Caspian gas supplies to Europe while skirting Russia.

"The interest and attention toward Turkmenistan will rise and we must expect even more heated competition for Turkmen gas," says Federico Bordonaro, a Rome-based energy analyst. "We will see how the European Union and United States are able to quickly react in such a way that the trans-Caspian, Nabucco, and White Stream pipelines will be more realistic."

But real work has yet to begin on any of those projects, which for now remain no more than pipe dreams. Indeed, the Caspian region still only has one route for energy exports that bypasses Russia: the relatively modest Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline.

White Stream aims to change that. Formerly known as the Georgia-Ukraine-European Union pipeline, White Stream would run 2,000 meters under the Black Sea, its preferred route going from Georgia to Ukraine's Crimean coast and on to Europe. Plans call for building in three phases with an eventual output of 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually.

With Europe's thirst for energy supplies expected to double over the next two decades, the need for such a project is increasingly obvious, says Giorgi Vashakmadze, White Stream's corporate development chief.

According to the results of a British company's survey on October 13, one Turkmen field, Yolotan-Osman, appears to have enough gas to become the world's fourth- or fifth-largest gas reserve. But to tap into it and other Turkmen resources, Vashakmadze says it will take a much more determined show of Western political will to persuade Caspian countries -- already wooed by markets in Russia, China, and Iran -- to back projects like White Stream.

"We have enormous riches in the Caspian,” Vashakmadze told RFE/RL before the gas audit results were announced. "We have a huge demand in Europe, and the issue is why it's not linked yet and why supplies from the Caspian to Europe have not been achieved at a level which would correspond to supply and demand."

Russian Influence
The obvious answer is Russia. The Caspian power for more than 100 years, Russia had a monopoly over the region's gas exports to Europe until the BTE’s completion in late 2006. And now, through its gas giant Gazprom, Moscow is backing South Stream, a pipeline that would pump Caspian gas via Russia to Italy.

Because of Russia's influence over former Soviet republics like Turkmenistan, many analysts see South Stream as the pipeline most likely to be built, even if Gazprom recently delayed its planned launch by two years to 2015. Vashakmadze acknowledges that both White Stream and Nabucco, which he calls complimentary projects, face major hurdles. "Russia does not seem to be irritated by [Caspian gas] deals related to China or maybe even with Pakistan or India [TAPI], but it shows a negative attitude toward deals going to Europe," he says.

Gazprom is currently seeking to increase the amounts of gas it buys from both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, eastern Caspian states with which it has long-term supply contracts. Those two countries have shown interest in alternative export routes but have only committed to the Russian one.

To win them over, Vashakmadze says Caspian countries will need to see concrete European interest for much larger amounts of gas and the possibility of unhindered and sufficiently low-risk transportation.

"These countries need to decide if they can afford to contradict what they understand is Russia's desire -- and would they do this for very small volumes -- for peanuts?" Vashakmadze says. "Is it worthwhile to irritate a neighbor and partner for something that really does not bring much benefit? Only in cases where countries can see that potential exports to Europe are sufficiently high, capable of providing a significant part of their future revenues, will they decide to go this way -- otherwise it is not worthwhile for them."
The EU currently sees the Nabucco project as a top priority. This month, however, the EU is considering according the same priority status to White Stream.

That would create an important multiplier effect. "This effect goes far beyond the simple result of establishing bigger combined potential capacity,"  Vashakmadze says. "A more important result is the dramatic reduction of perceived transportation risks, so important for governments in [the Caspian region] and potential upstream investors."

Planning For Conflict
Risk has risen, however, in the wake of the August war between Russia and Georgia. Some analysts, for example, have suggested that Ukraine's Crimea, the headquarters for Russia's Black Sea Fleet, could in the future become the object of a conflict between Moscow and Kyiv. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has called Crimea a possible "future South Ossetia," referring to the Georgian breakaway region that Russia says it defended against Georgian aggression.

An alternative, or possibly additional, route for White Stream includes a pipeline to Romania -- either directly from Georgia or from Crimea. White Stream would also make use of already-developed pipeline technology used in Blue Stream, a Russian pipeline to Turkey.

Vashakmadze says that while Russia has shown its willingness to influence the Caucasus, the conflict’s outcome may help push forward Nabucco and White Stream. He says an EU resolution passed on September 1 "cites very loudly the need to develop the alternative supply routes. This probably makes the countries in the Caspian much more confident.... Probably much more needs to be done, but this is the way for us to succeed."

Vashakmadze won't name the project's partners, but says they are "more than 10." He also says White Stream is in constant consultation with shippers and distributors and "all relevant parties who might have gas or might want to transport gas."

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

διαβάστε επίσης στην Πολιτική Προσέγγιση: Κεντρική Ασία , nCa: Massive Gas Reserves: Dangers Ahead for Turkmenistan

South Ossetia Floods European Rights Court With Georgia Cases

The European Court of Human Rights has received nearly 2,000 applications from South Ossetians complaining of illegal treatment at the hands of Georgia, the president of the court, Jean-Paul Costa, has said.

The complaints have been filed over the past two months, since Russia and Georgia went to war over the breakaway Georgian region on August 7.

They follow applications made by Georgia to the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights against Russia, accusing its neighbor of war crimes, including ethnic cleansing.

Russia has also made complaints to international courts against Georgia, and Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said last month Russia would help any citizens of South Ossetia wanting to make complaints against Georgia.

"There will be a massive increase in the workload of the court," Costa told Reuters. "We cannot just throw away these cases."

Asked if he thought Russia was part of a coordinated effort to overwhelm the court with applications, he said: "Yes, it's possible. It's difficult to say that it's obvious or it's likely. But it's possible."

The European Court of Human Rights also has two outstanding claims by Georgia against Russia, the first dating from 2007 and the second from the recent war. The 2007 case relates to allegations of forced expulsions of Georgians from Russia and is not expected to be completed until early next year. The other case, dealing with events in August, is only at the preliminary stage, Costa said.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Ingushetia and the Caucasus

From time to time, we receive occasional contributions from the highly respected Russian human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov, who heads up Russia's Rule of Law Institute. His most recent piece focused on the Olympics and the war. Mandatory disclaimer: Markelov's article does not necessarily represent my opinion, this blog, or its editors.

Ingushetia – the missed opportunity of the Caucasus?

By Stanislaw Markelov

A killing – is always more than just death. A killing raises the most painful and acute questions: “Who is at fault?”, “How will they answer?” and “Is the aggrieved party of relatives and like-minded people prepared likewise to cross the line of blood and death?”

This they know best in the North Caucasus, where besides the general pain of an unjust death there exists also the purely personal duty of blood vengeance. This duty very rigidly regulates all relations of disagreement and dispute. On the one hand, a person will think ten times before pulling out a weapon, inasmuch as not just he alone will answer for it, but also his children and dear ones; on the other, vendetta has so many times decimated entire kin-groups that direct war has probably looked more humane and peace-loving than the eternal slaughter of teyps [a unit of kin-tribe organization of the Chechen people consisting of several kin-group communities—Trans.] who despise one another.

With the killing of Yevloyev, something unexpected and horrible has taken place – something we were unable to assess right away, and are only gradually starting to feel on ourselves the result of the «Caucasusization» of all Russian politics. Into the orbit of blood vengeance now enter not only individual kin-groups or an entire people, the killing has touched upon all of Russian society, and, irrespective of the silence of our mass information media, real politics are already dictated both by the interests of the killers and by the question about the choice of the actions of those who will take vengeance.

You don’t even need to know the morals of the Caucasus in order to understand that there will be vengeance. The killing of Politkovskaya shocked, and, maybe, led immediately to big political consequences. But even with all her constant work in the Caucasus, she was still an outsider person, who had grown up in another milieu and in an absolutely different culture. The consequences of her killing for the Caucasus can be political, but not personal. With the killing of Yevloyev, personal consequences may turn into political ones for us all. In life, Yevloyev exceeded his significance as simply a respected person having his own business and sphere of influence. Even with all the contradictoriness of this personality, with his name are associated two phenomena which have become new pages in the development of the civic life of the Caucasus.

The first and most noticeable of his progeny – this is the literate organization of the information war. He was not the first in the Caucasus to understand the importance of media portals, including in the nets of the Internet. The separatist Chechen «Kavkaz-centr» always was a noticeable instrument of war. But still this was a decidedly secondary argument of the conflict, where first place was clearly given to the machine-gun and explosive devices. Yevloyev’s portal «Ingushetia.ru» was self-sufficient and did not fulfill the functions of serving an already erupted conflict.

On the contrary, this site itself became a center of the conflict, having transferred it into the informational plane and having made it much more significant than any other source of reports on Ingushetia. It is interesting that this was taking place in a republic where the majority of the inhabitants have only the vaguest idea about what the Internet is.

Unfortunately, in response to the informational attack there followed anything but informational retaliatory actions. The house of Yevloyev himself and of his comrades in arms was strafed with gunfire on numerous occasions, while the site they tried to cover up [the power attempted to shut down—Trans.] by decision of a court. I as a lawyer am not attempting to contest this decision, all the more so given that there were formal grounds – the publication examined by the court is indeed fiercely anti-Ossetian. But practically all of the political publications of Ingushetia printed anti-Ossetian material. Exactly the same way as in Ossetia the mass information media are no less strongly fired up with an anti-Ingush directionality. There have yet to be any incidents where some publication was shut down due to attacks by neighboring peoples on one another. This means, the publication being examined by the court too was not the reason, but the excuse. That same excuse because of which formally one could cover up [shut down] just about every one of the mass information media of both Ingushetia and Ossetia.

The second action of Yevloyev’s is less noticeable, because he did not stand at its sources, but precisely the significance of this factor greatly exceeds the boundaries of little Ingushetia, and, most likely, even all of the North Caucasus. I have in mind the organization and creation of a legal opposition.

In Russia there is no legal opposition. The so-called parliamentary opposition parties – are either the leading sycophantic toadies, like the CPRF, or don’t even attempt to declare about their oppositionality, jostling with the other parties at the feeding-trough of power (like «A Just Russia»). All the rest of the oppositioneers have been thrown overboard from official politics and are doomed to the destiny of remaining fringe groups.

In the North Caucasus there is also no legal opposition. Everyone whom the power has gotten its hands on in the Caucasus has an alternative: to immediately head for the forests and the hills or to pretend that you’re maintaining true allegiance, helping those who have headed for the forests and the hills with money, food, shelter.

So why should there suddenly appear a legal opposition in Ingushetia? And all the more so one that functions using classical opposition methods, i.e. gathering the people on the street, conducting information wars, audaciously criticizing the power, which, to put it mildly, has aught it can be criticized for. This legal opposition found itself a legal and respected leader in the person of Aushev, its businessmen, its civic support – everything about which a legal – and, most importantly, a peaceful – political force ought to be thinking about. But about what kind of phenomenon of a legal opposition can one speak in a republic where shots and explosions take place every day, while any operation by the special services turns into a pogrom, where it is already impossible to tell who is the “bandit” and who is the employee of the organs?

The appearance of a legal opposition in a republic of the North Caucasus, which has now become key at the intersection of political interests, could have become a chance. A legal opposition, by definition, must be open and officially advertise itself. It can not switch over to violent actions, inasmuch as this will create for it a most negative image. A legal opposition draws off all of the disaffected and all protest sentiments, transforming the steam of dissatisfaction into rallies, pickets, civic protest actions, in the extreme case into the closing of streets and peaceful takeovers of state buildings, but not into weapons and guerrilla brigades.

One should not even determine who was right in the dispute of Zyazikov and Yevloyev in order to understand how important was the Ingush example of civic protest for the whole of the North Caucasus. They killed Yevloyev at that moment when the forces standing behind him had united with Aushev and created their own literately constructed opposition vertical.

In consideration of the fact that it was precisely in Ingushetia that they had been intensively provoking the Russian community in recent years, jettisoning its informal leaders and arranging constant attacks on Russian houses, one could have expected that whether it wanted to or not, the opposition would have to reach out and make contact with the Russian community, at the very least on the principle of “against a common enemy”. And this would signify at least gradual distancing from the influence of radical Islamism and mountain nationalism.

The Ingush siloviki assert that the radical Islamism and armed underground in Ingushetia – are from Chechnya. The militants supposedly redeployed from the place of destroyed bases, in order to terrorize a neighboring republic. This is a pretty fairy tale for those who don’t know the Caucasus. For an entire underground to redeploy unnoticed from one republic into another is impossible. And besides, the majority of the objects of the operations of the siloviki – these are local Ingush people, who have come into the underground relatively recently.

Just yesterday they had a choice – to take up arms or to try to attain the truth at rallies and opposition gatherings. Will they have such a choice tomorrow?

Or will the blood vengeance announced by the father of the killed begin to be carried out not only by relatives of Yevloyev, but by the multitudinous army of the disaffected?

In the Caucasus there is a rule that if a person has pulled out a weapon, then he’s got to shoot already. And there, unlike in the Chechovian theatrical principle, the weapon is not a prop and it does not wait for the third act to be discharged – they fire from it right away. In this sense, the words of Zyazikov about how the killing of Yevloyev could be directed against the Ingush power look positively prophetic. His cousin has already added to the bloody score.

Having read this, many will ask if there is a way out or if the author is scaring readers, practically presaging a picture of massive machine-gun fire? Nothing of the sort; there is a way out and it was thought up long ago right in the Caucasus, so there is no need to invent anything new. If every blood feud did not stop, then the North Caucasus would long ago have become deserted and its slopes would be strewn with the graves of the blood-feuders.

When the fulfillment of blood vengeance would already start to infringe on the interests of society, the elders would “separate the kin-groups”, that is they would give an indication to one kin-group of blood-feuders to abandon native places and move to another place, so that the other kin-group would no longer have anyone to take vengeance on. Thus the vendetta would cease on its own.

As the culprit in the killing of Yevloyev they are naming only one person, and we will not even clarify if he is directly involved in the killing or not; this is not all that important any more now. To exonerate himself he can make any declarations, but as the leader person, responsible for everything in the republic, the death of the leading oppositioneer nevertheless remains on him.

The prevention of the banditization of Ingushetia – this is already not an Ingush task and even not a North Caucasian one, but a Russia-wide one. And there is not even any need to talk about the public interest in preventing collective vengeance for the killing of Yevloyev. This means, that person whom they call responsible for the killing must leave the republic, all the more so because he’s got somewhere to go. Prior to enthronement in Ingushetia, he had calmly lived in another region, remaining in the cadre reserve of the current power. Isn’t it about time for him to set off there into the reserve? This will be the most rational of the things he could do. And we will heave a sigh of relief and, maybe, we won’t receive reports quite as often about the latest bombings or killings in a region that threatens to become the “bandit underbelly of Russia”.

Originally posted at Robert Amsterdam's blog

διαβάστε επίσης: Διαδήλωση με αφορμή τη δολοφονία του δημοσιογράφου στην Ινγκουσετία, Η δολοφονία του Γεβλόεφ ανάβει φιτίλι στην Ινγκουσετία, Ινγκουσετία: Διαδήλωση με αφορμή τη δολοφονία δημοσιογράφου, Εξι ανθρωποκτονίες στην Ινγκουσετία, από την ανταλλαγή πυρών μετακινούμενων ενόπλων με τα σώματα ασφάλειας.

update #1, 20/9/08: source: RFE/RL Over the past two years, the security situation in Ingushetia has deteriorated to the point that shootings, explosions, and abductions have become an everyday occurrence. Indeed, Ingushetia has overtaken Chechnya and Daghestan to become the least stable of the seven North Caucasus republics. The Russian leadership, for its part, appears either unwilling to acknowledge the accelerating breakdown in law and order or at a loss how to reverse it.

The current crisis dates from June 2004, when Chechen and Ingush fighters under the command of Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev launched attacks on police and security forces in Ingushetia, killing up to 80 people in retaliation for the detention by security forces over the previous two years of numerous young Ingush men, most of whom have never been found. Since then, the resistance has continued to target Ingush police and other law enforcement officials who are viewed as collaborators, Russian Interior Ministry Internal Troops deployed to Ingushetia, and members of other security bodies, including border guards.

read the whole article here: