Κυριακή 9 Νοεμβρίου 2008

Semi-presidential democracy in East Asia

by Benjamin Reilly

east_asia_pol_95 East Asia contains three of the world’s semi-presidential democracies (as pointed out in the latest APEC Economies Newsletter here) : Taiwan, Mongolia, and East Timor. Each of these countries is an unusual case of democratisation: Taiwan is one of East Asia’s famous ‘tiger’ economies and the world’s only Sinitic democracy, but faces an ongoing crisis of nationhood; Mongolia is one of the few unambiguous cases of a successful transition to democracy and a market economy in the post-Communist world; while East Timor is both Asia’s poorest nation and its newest democracy. Prior to their democratic transitions, each was also under the influence of a large foreign power — be it Russia in relation to Mongolia, Indonesia in East Timor, or China’s claim to sovereignty in relation to Taiwan. This is not a propitious starting point for a transition to democracy; indeed, in different ways, each country seemed to lack some of the essential preconditions for successful democratisation.

Nonetheless, each has succeeded to the extent that successive free elections and peaceful changes of power have now occurred.As part of their transitions to democracy, East Timor, Mongolia and Taiwan each chose semi-presidential constitutions. Semi-presidentialism is an increasingly popular constitutional model which combines a directly elected president with significant powers as well as a prime minister chosen by the legislature. France and Portugal are long-standing examples, along with many new democracies in Eastern Europe and Southern Africa. In Asia, East Timor, Mongolia and Taiwan are all clearly semi-presidential in the sense of having ‘a popularly elected, fixed-term president existing alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament’.

However, their presidential powers of each differs considerably: Taiwan’s constitution grants extensive powers to the president, while in East Timor the president is largely a symbolic figure whose most important power is as supreme commander of the armed forces — a provision that was to have great importance during the internal conflict in East Timor in 2006. Mongolia sits somewhere between these two in terms of the scope of its presidential powers.

Despite their status as competitive electoral democracies, national politics in each of these countries has been hampered by recurrent problems of gridlocked government, political instability and politically-motivated violence during periods of ‘divided government’ when the president and the majority of the legislature come from different political parties. These pathologies are due, in part, to their semi-presidential constitutional structures, particularly the propensity of such systems to deliver periods of political cohabitation. These ‘split majorities’ have had a pronounced negative impact on political stability and effectiveness, weakening the consolidation of democracy in each of these three cases.

For significant periods of their recent democratic experience, the phenomenon of divided government placed immense pressures on the developing political systems of Mongolia, Taiwan and especially East Timor. One reason for this is that in each case, the initial period of divided government came early in the country’s democratic experience, and many of the political actors had no real sense of how to deal with it. Moreover, divided government brought with it a series of political problems that undermined political institutionalization, turning national politics into a competition between powerful individuals. This led to familiar patterns of political polarization, instability and violence emerging in each country, although a markedly different levels. While the severity of these differed considerably – the crisis in East Timor, for instance, was clearly of a different magnitude from that of Taiwan or Mongolia – the incidence of these problems of political polarisation, instability and violence can be compared to those times when unified governments were in place in each country.

Mongolia had the shortest period of divided government, with cohabitation lasting four years, from June 1996 to July 2000. East Timor’s period of divided government can be assessed as lasting from April 2002, when Xanana Gusmão won the country’s first presidential election with a massive 87 per cent of the popular vote, through to Mari Alkatiri’s resignation and replacement by Jose Ramos Horta as prime minister in July 2006. Taiwan’s experience of divided government was a constant throughout Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, from 2000 to 2008, as his Democratic Progressive Party controlled executive power but the opposition ‘pan-Blue’ coalition, led by the formerly-ruling Kuomintang, maintained a majority in the legislature.

One way of illustrating the problems of political stability in these semi-presidential countries is the World Bank’s Governance Matters database, which includes an aggregate measure of ‘political stability’ for all states drawn from a combination of public and private sources. This ‘political stability’ measure combines indices of politically-motivated internal and external violence in a given country with a separate measure of government durability, that is the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs, and to stay in office. As shown in Figure 1, which compares these indicators for each of the three country cases over the past decade, political stability tends to decline during periods of divided government.

In Mongolia, for example, the stability measures were at their lowest during the 1997–2000 period of cohabitation, but have risen since the resumption of single-party rule, at least until the aftermath of the 2008 parliamentary elections. In Taiwan, too, stability measures were at their highest in the late 1990s but declined with the election of President Chen Shui-bian in 2000 which ushered in Taiwan’s period of divided government, with the lowest levels reached in 2006. In East Timor, stability declined sharply between 2000 and 2002 as the UN administration prepared the country for independence, and have since declined considerably further, with the lowest levels reached in 2006 when the standoff between Prime Minister Alkatiri and President Gusmão came to a head.

These indicators help illustrate a key point: while semi-presidentialism has its benefits, it places unusual strains on new democracies. In particular, periods of divided government can put great stress on the stability of countries which have not yet developed established practices of political coexistence. In addition, the uncertainties of constitutional law in situations of shared power create their own problems: in these three country cases, disagreements over which particular office would exercise which particular constitutional powers was a recurring source of conflict. No constitution can codify all situations which office-holders are likely to face, meaning that even the most thorough constitutional text will inevitably leave some grey areas unspecified. This is a particular problem for semi-presidential constitutions, as it is precisely those grey areas of uncertainty which can provide the basis for ongoing conflict.

source: eastasiaforum.org

Σάββατο 8 Νοεμβρίου 2008

Ο εφιάλτης στον δρόμο ... χωρίς διόδια: Τί άλλαξε;

Δεν υπάρχει πιο ωραίο συναίσθημα από εκείνο που μπορεί να δοκιμάσει κάποιος, όταν γνωρίζει ή μαθαίνει εκ των υστέρων ότι οι σκέψεις του ή οι απόψεις του αυτόνομες ή εντός μιας ευρύτερης συλλογικής προσπάθειας καταφέρνουν να επιφέρουν ένα μικρό, ελάχιστο αποτέλεσμα σε μία καθημερινότητα άρρωστη και προβληματική, που ενοχλεί και καταπιέζει... που πολλές φορές καταδικάζει τους πολίτες να ζουν, να εργάζονται να μετακινούνται και να ονειρεύονται με κίνδυνο ακόμη και της ίδιας τους της ζωής! 

Πριν από ένα μήνα περίπου, από αυτό εδώ το ιστολόγιο, έγραφα στην ανάρτησή μου " Ο εφιάλτης στον δρόμο ... με ή χωρίς διόδια":

Το 2008 είναι μία χρονιά πολλών αλλαγών για την εργασία μου καθώς - μεταξύ άλλων, δεν χρειάζεται και να ταξιδεύω τόσο συχνά όσο παλαιότερα. Έτσι, αγαπημένες διαδρομές όπως η Ναυπάκτου-Ιτέας δεν αποτελούν για μένα μέρος της επαγγελματικής μου ρουτίνας τώρα πια, αλλά ευχάριστο περάσμα από την μία πλευρά της Ελλάδας στην άλλη. Ακόμη περισσότερο, μπορώ πλέον να διακρίνω ακόμη και την πιο ελάχιστη μεταβολή του δρόμου και του τοπίου τριγύρω.

Και εκεί ήταν που αντίκρυσα ιδίοις όμμασι το γελοίον του πράγματος!!! Είχαν τοποθετήσει - σε... "επιλεγμένα" σημεία - κάμερες ελέγχου της ταχύτητας(!). Όσοι έχουν ταξιδέψει από Ναύπακτο προς Λαμία και το αντίστροφο, τουλάχιστον για μία φορά στην ζωή τους, γνωρίζουν ότι είναι ένας δρόμος δύσκολος και επικίνδυνος, για τον οδηγό που δεν τον γνωρίζει, όχι όμως λόγω κίνησης αλλά, επειδή ο σχεδιασμός του ήταν και είναι προβληματικός (προδιαγραφές 1821), ενώ το οδόστρωμα σε αρκετά σημεία έχει τα κακά του χάλια! Ειδικά το κομμάτι Ιτέας-Ναυπάκτου θα μπορούσε να χαρακτηριστεί κι ως "δρόμος-φάντασμα", αφού τον αφήνουν στην μοίρα του που δεν είναι άλλη από την φυσική του αποσύνθεση χρόνο με τον χρόνο.

Σε αυτόν λοιπόν τον δρόμο, τα "τσακάλια" του "αρμοδίων" Αρχών επέλεξαν να τοποθετήσουν κάμερες για να ελέγξουν τί; Την κυκλοφορία που εκ των πραγμάτων είναι αραιή και ιδιαίτερα αργή, αφού ο δρόμος δεν προσφέρεται σε "τσαχπίνιδες" οδηγούς; Κι όχι μόνον αυτό! Αντί να τοποθετήσουν τις κάμερες σε σημεία που θα μπορούσαν να δικαιολογηθούν, τις έχουν τοποθετήσει στους... "αγρούς" και τις "εξοχές"! Το χειρότερο απ' όλα; Οι "υπεύθυνοι" του όλου "εγχειρήματος", πληρώνονται για την ... "δική μας ασφάλεια"! Πληρώνονται και για τις ανοησίες τους!

Έπειτα από ένα μήνα, κάνοντας την ίδια ακριβώς διαδρομή, παρατήρησα αρκετές αλλαγές που για πρώτη φορά ήταν τόσο πολύ εμφανείς! Εντοπίστηκαν διορθώσεις και νέα ασφαλτόστρωση ορισμένων μεγάλων τμημάτων του οδοστρώματος, ενώ επισημάνθηκαν με έντονη λευκή-κόκκινη σήμανση οι πολύ επικίνδυνες στροφές του δρόμου. Μέσα σ' ενα μήνα - πιστεύω - πως αυτές οι βελτιώσεις είναι οι ελάχιστες που θα μπορούσαν να πραγματοποιηθούν, αποτελεί όμως θετική κίνηση για την ασφάλεια των οδηγών και όλων όσων κινούνται επί της συγκεκριμένης τέως εθνικής οδού!

Χρειάζονται ακόμη περισσότερα!

α) Περισσότερη σήμανση στις κατά τόπους κατοικημένες περιοχές.

β) Ολοκληρωτική διόρθωση του οδοστρώματος με διαπλατύνσεις, διόρθωση κλίσης στροφών,  αντικατάσταση και όχι απλή συντήρηση της ασφάλτου,

γ) Διόρθωση και επαναπροσδιορισμό ορίων ταχύτητας...

... Ενδεχομένως, κι αρκετές ακόμη πιο ειδικές παρεμβάσεις τις οποίες δεν είμαι σε θέση να γνωρίζω καθώς δεν είμαι συγκοινωνιολόγος. Παρ' όλα αυτά, επειδή η ασφάλειά μας προέχει και πρέπει να επικροτούμε κάθε θετική ανταπόκριση απ' όπου κι αν προέρχεται, όσο μικρή ή μεγάλη κι αν είναι, δεν μπορώ παρά να αισθάνομαι λίγο περισσότερο ασφαλής νιώθοντας ότι κάπου, κάποιος ενδιαφέρεται και δείχνει αποφασισμένος να εργαστεί για το καλό όλων μας!   

EU Fights For Nabucco's Future

By Ahto Lobjakas

pipeline BRUSSELS -- The fate of the Nabucco pipeline project appears to be hanging by a thread. No EU official would publicly admit this, but the signs tell their own story. First, as a senior EU official told reporters in Brussels on November 4 on condition of anonymity, transit talks with Turkey have stalled. Second, Azerbaijan is dithering between competing Russian and EU bids for its gas exports, which are crucial to bringing Nabucco on line in 2012 as planned. Third, in the long term, Azerbaijani gas alone will not be sufficient. The EU official said that "other countries in the region" must supply most of the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas Nabucco is expected to carry by 2020.

But Iran, with the world's second-largest reserves, remains off-limits as long as it continues to enrich uranium. And Turkmenistan, with its enormous export potential, has yet to decide whether to invest in a trans-Caspian pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan -- and Nabucco. The common thread for all these countries, and the EU as the ultimate beneficiary of the 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline, is the question of intent and commitment.

EU Makes Its Case
On November 5-7, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will visit Turkey and Azerbaijan to demonstrate the bloc's continued commitment to Nabucco.

"The first objective of this trip is to show the political commitment of the European Commission to the Nabucco project and to reaffirm once more that we are convinced that it is going to be online according to the planned timetable," says Piebalgs' spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas.

The Russian-Georgian conflict sent shock waves through the region and among potential investors. But official Brussels remains steadfast in the belief that Nabucco is safe from Moscow's interference. "Russia would jeopardize its reputation as a reliable supplier" to the EU if it acted in any way to damage Nabucco, said one official.

However, none of Nabucco's essential building blocks is currently in place. Turkey continues to hold out for a better transit deal while Azerbaijan has yet to formally commit its gas exports to the project. Tarradellas says that while Piebalgs' visit is a sign that the EU is upping the ante in its talks with the two countries. "We're going to discuss also the remaining differences with the Turks and the question of the transit of the gas through Turkey," he says, "and then we're going to be visiting Azerbaijan, which will be probably be the first supplier of gas for the Nabucco pipeline."

The senior EU official who spoke on condition of anonymity said that, apart from charging a transit fee, Turkey wants to divert 15 percent of Nabucco's gas for cheap domestic use. As Azerbaijan is insisting on selling its gas at European market rates minus transit costs, the Nabucco consortium and its subsidiaries in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria would be left to pick up the tab. Piebalgs is keen to break the deadlock before the end of the year. In Turkey this week he will meet with the country's president, prime minister, foreign minister, and economy minister.

Where Will Gas Come From?
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has yet to decide to whom to sell the estimated 7-9 bcm of gas it is able to export annually in the early years of Nabucco's operations. The senior Brussels official said EU companies are pitted against Russian competitors. There are fears in the EU that Russian political pressure could clinch the deal for Russian bidders. A decision is expected sometime in 2009.

EU officials say that the fact that Piebalgs has secured a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a sign of "interest" on the part of Baku in doing business with the EU. But Azerbaijan's gas reserves, even if supplemented by the planned expansion of the Shah Deniz field, will not be sufficient to keep Nabucco in business.

And this is where Nabucco currently hits a wall. Iran will remain untouchable  in trade terms as long as it refuses to cease uranium enrichment. Like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be swayed by Moscow's cash -- or outright pressure. And even if Turkmenistan's recently confirmed reserves of 14 trillion bcm dwarf Russia's own transit capacity, Moscow will be seeking to deny the EU a piece of the pie.
Piebalgs is hoping to soon visit Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, his aides say. This leaves Iraq and Egypt as the only other viable regional suppliers for Nabucco -- with one extremely unstable and the other rather remote.

Meanwhile, EU officials reject suggestions Nabucco could eventually carry Russian gas diverted south. This, they say, would defeat the purpose of Nabucco -- which is to diversify supplies. (Competing Russian projects, such as South Stream, are not seen as a problem, however. The EU's growing demand for gas will make sure it has a market and the diversification of transport routes is a good in itself).

If the degree of insecurity associated with the 8 billion-euro ($10.3 billion) project coupled with the global financial crisis is making potential investors nervous, officials in Brussels remain serene. When pressed, they do point out, however, that should private investors balk, public lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank stand ready to step in.

Initially published at RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2008. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.